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In this dissertation, I argue that democracy is a human right.  In order to support 
this claim, my argument will proceed from a foundational moral grounding (Indirect 
Utilitarianism), through analyses of the concepts involved (human rights and democracy), 
to my conclusion.  I begin by specifying the definition of democracy I find superior; 
proceed to an explication of the normative theory to which I appeal for my claims; then to 
a discussion of the justification of rights in general; followed by a discussion of human 
rights, and finally to my case for the human right to democracy.  I follow this with a 
survey of the literature representing the opposing position, in order to catalogue the 
concerns my positive account will need to address.  I then proceed to my own 
justificatory account.  Having presented my positive account, I address the various 
criticisms of the minority position, using arguments that either blunt such criticism or 
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EXPLICATION OF THE PROJECT 
 
 The aim of this dissertation is to argue that democracy is a human right.  In order 
to support this claim, my argument will proceed from a foundational moral grounding 
(Indirect Utilitarianism), through analyses of the concepts involved (human rights and 
democracy), to my conclusion.  I will offer Indirect Utilitarianism as a previously 
unexplored and viable justification of the human right to democracy.   
 My motivation in addressing the question of whether there is a human right to 
democracy stems from my strong objection to a particular strain in political thought, that 
claims that certain groups of people are ‘not ready for democracy’.  I contend that 
nondemocratic societies inhibit individual self-development, and hope to demonstrate as 
much in the present work.  Granted as much, it seems that there is a great deal at stake in 
the question of ‘readiness’.  Millions of individual lives may be stunted in their self-
development, dismissed as consigned to this fate as a result of the rationale that, since 
their society is not ‘ready’, there’s little to be done by those either within or outside the 
society in question to advance democratic governance.   
 Among those who defend the kind of claim to which I object are Omar Suleiman, 
former Egyptian Vice President, and the historian Bernard Lewis.  Both were reacting to 
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political events that have come to be called the “Arab Spring” or – the term I prefer – the 
“Arab Awakening.”  Before leaving office, Suleiman claimed that Egypt is not ready for 
democracy1 (a claim savvy autocrats are encouraged to eschew).  In a February 25th, 2011 
interview2 – once the Arab Awakening3 was well underway – Lewis argued that Arabs in 
general are not ready for democracy: 
We, in the Western world particularly, tend to think of democracy in our own 
terms – that’s natural and normal – to mean periodic elections in our style. But I 
think it’s a great mistake to try and think of the Middle East in those terms and 
that can only lead to disastrous results, as you’ve already seen in various places. 
They are simply not ready for free and fair elections... ‘The language of Western 
democracy is for the most part newly translated and not intelligible to the great 
masses.4 
Motivated by the desire to push back against such assertions, I will in the present work 
argue that democracy is a human right.  There are a number of parts to this claim, and I 
will need to account, among other things, for the following: what democracy is, and how 
it is desirable; what a right is, and how it can be justified; what is entailed by calling a 
right a human right, and how this particular species can be justified; and why these 
questions matter in a contemporary context.  Naturally, many other questions will arise in 
this discussion, as well as many more arguments that address them.   
 In this chapter I will outline the argument presented in the following chapters, 
followed by an introduction to the theoretic issues involved, and presentation of the 
problematic of the political situation of women in Iraq as an illustrative example.   In 
Chapter 2, I define and offer a particular conception of democracy, in order to define 
standards my foundational moral theory can be shown to meet.  In Chapter 3, I introduce 
the foundational moral theory I employ to justify my arguments.  In Chapter 4, I present 
Allen Buchanan’s case for the human right to democracy, and suggest a way of 
strengthening it.  In Chapter 5, I apply all the foregoing to a particular conception of 
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human rights, in order to conclude the argument that democracy is a human right.  
Following an overview of my main argument, I turn to elaborations of the various 
chapters, in order.   
 
Overview 
 In the discussion of democracy’s relation to human rights, the predominant view 
(as represented by John Rawls, Joshua Cohen, and others) is that the right to democratic 
governance is not a human right.  That is, whether there is a right of any other kind to 
democratic governance, these theorists deny specifically that it is not a human right.  
Even when it is conceded that individuals have some right to democratic governance, the 
justification for this right is most often posited as contingent upon other, more 
fundamental rights, but not as a fundamental right of the kind represented by human 
rights.   
 In my dissertation I argue the minority position on this issue, that there is a right 
to democratic governance and that it is a human right.  I do so first by specifying which 
definition of democracy I find superior, then by explication of the normative theory to 
which I appeal for my claims, then to a discussion of the justification of rights in general, 
followed by a discussion of human rights in general, and finally to my case for the human 
right to democracy.  This I follow this with a survey of the literature representing the 
majority position, in order to catalogue the concerns my positive account will need to 
address.  I then proceed to my own justificatory account.  Having presented my positive 
account, I address the various criticisms of the minority position, using arguments that 
either blunt such criticism or demonstrate how the criticisms do not address my own 
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position.   
 The problem, as I see it, comes down to determining what kind of defense can be 
made for the claim that the right to democratic governance is a human right.  The 
narrower question I plan to address is how much promise a consequentialist defense 
offers as a justification for the minority claim.  Arguments are well-known that 
utilitarianism yields conclusions that transgress rights, due to the aggregation of utility 
involved in its standard forms.  I argue that David Lyons’ Indirect Utilitarianism (IU) 
represents a consequentialist account that is not only immune to standard criticisms, but 
also offers a way of cohering intuitions that are normally at odds with one another: that 
while aggregation of welfare ought not to override rights, consequences matter morally.  I 
answer the question regarding the kind of defense that can be made for the minority 
position with the thesis that IU is sufficient to fulfill this task.  Indeed, an underlying 
motivation for my argument is that the largely deontological nature of the post-Rawlsian 
debate has ignored the possibilities offered by consequentialism in the IU form.  My 
methodology is to present an account of democracy as a human right and show how IU 
works to support it.  I turn now to an elaboration of each of these three aspects of my 
dissertation – the problem, my thesis, and my methodology.   
 
The Problem 
Justificatory accounts of rights take one of two main approaches: status-based 
accounts are deontological in form; instrumental accounts are consequentialist.  In light 
of persistently-entrenched disagreement over the superiority of either view, I limit myself 
in this dissertation to transcendental support for a particular consequentialist approach – 
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IU – presenting this option not as superior, but as having a certain under-recognized 
benefit: that it can furnish a justification for a human right to democratic governance.  
Thus I do not intend to make a case for the superiority of the particular consequentialist 
approach I employ over, say, a deontological approach.  Instead, I aim to show how IU 
can provide argumentation most think utilitarian theories cannot.  I will then move on to 
an exposition of IU, and show how it can support my main claim, that the right to 
democratic governance is a human right.    
 
Foundering of the Debate 
 The post-Rawlsian discussion of whether democracy is a human right, while not 
extensive, has failed as yet to yield a satisfactory account of the issue.  On the question of 
whether or not democracy is human right, the work of John Rawls left the discussion in a 
problematic place.  The literature is constituted on the one hand by tentative accounts that 
democracy is not a human right and on the other hand by more emphatic yet indecisive 
arguments that it is.  This section presents a brief overview of the relevant literature as 
background for my argument.   
 John Rawls argues5 that democracy is not a human right, because he believes that 
decent hierarchical peoples should be included in the society of peoples, despite their 
nondemocratic forms of government. Rawls thus criticizes the position that political 
rights are human rights as intolerant, thereby setting the terms of the debate, by which 
human rights are properly considered as minimal standards that do not accommodate 
claims to democratic governance. Joshua Cohen appears to accord with Rawls on this 
point, arguing that although a theocratic society (for instance) may be for that reason 
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unjust, it does not for that reason alone seem to violate human rights.6 
 Some prominent theorists do support a human right to democracy.  Thomas Pogge 
characterizes democratic governance as part of a cosmopolitan human rights standard, 
which he supports.7  Pogge explicitly characterizes the right to democratic governance as 
a human right, arguing that individuals significantly affected by political decisions ought 
for that reason to have some roughly equal influence in the making of that decision.  
Carol Gould argues that the relationship between human rights and democracy is properly 
understood not as one’s being a category of the other, but rather that they share a 
common root – freedom.  I mention these two authors for the purpose of demonstrating, 
for one, that there are those who agree with me on the central conclusion.  However, I do 
not believe that either of these two authors' accounts of a human right to democracy 
represents the strongest possible case.  But by way of making my own case, I return to 
Carol Gould's work in Chapter 4.   
 Generally, however, the question of whether democracy is a human right is not 
adequately addressed in the theoretical literature. The discussion appears to have 
foundered, with no decisive argument emerging on either side of the question.  A shift in 
the theoretical foundation of for democracy may thus be worth investigating.   
 One problem faced by human rights theorists is choosing the foundation to which to 
appeal in defending human rights. This problem arises due to the fact that a theory’s 
beginning determines, in part, its end. This, as Alistair Macleod notes,8 is because the 
particular justification given for a right is so intimately tied with its content and scope 
that the foundation provided determines to a significant degree the nature of the rights 
yielded by the particular theory. Working as one must with an elaborate array of social 
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and political considerations from conception to implementation of such rights, a human 
rights theorist runs the risk of choosing a foundation well-suited for some tasks, yet 
unsuited for others.   
 
Methodology 
I follow other authors who take the minority position, and present an argument 
that attempts to justify democracy as a human right, but do so with the innovation of 
deploying a consequentialist rights justification to make my case.  In order to show how 
IU works to support my claim that the right to democratic governance is a human right, I 
present the following order of auxiliary arguments: 
1 Define democracy and present a justification for it.   
2 Present IU and explain how it functions.   
3 Demonstrate the insufficiency of the most interesting version of the minority 
position, and argue for a particular improvement on it.   
4 Show that IU can support sufficiently robust claims about human rights in 
general, and then specifically the human right to democratic governance as I’ve 
specified in 3, above.   
Elaboration of these arguments follows.   
I first address the question of what is meant by democratic governance, in Chapter 
2.  I present a comprehensive evaluation of the variety of democratic theories offered by 
William Nelson, whose own positive account I endorse.  I then present the more detailed 
articulation of democratic theory proposed by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 
such that my consequentialist account might have a more specific set of goals for its 
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justificatory aim.  Nelson offers a consequentialist justification of democracy.  I will treat 
his account as a defensible elaboration on Lyons’ reading of John Stuart Mill.   
 Next, I present the consequentialist account in which I intend to ground my main 
argument’s claims about rights.  I aim to show how IU supports rights, in accordance 
with the functioning of Lyons’ theory as I’ve described it above.  (While Lyon’s 
treatment of the interpretation of IU I employ is only briefly treated in his Forms and 
Limits of Utilitarianism, I refer to the work of Richard Brandt and Peter Railton, in order 
to formulate my version of IU with greater specificity.)  I take care to avoid defining 
rights in a facile way that would render a consequentialist account vacuous.  I focus on 
showing the way in which IU provides a better defense for the human right to democratic 
governance than its utilitarian alternatives, rather than a full defense of either IU or 
consequentialism.   
I then demonstrate how this version of the minority position can benefit from 
augmentation, by presenting Allen Buchanan’s account of the human right to democratic 
governance.  I make the case for an improvement on his theory that involves Elizabeth 
Anderson’s notion of equality (among others), before demonstrating how IU can also 
support this “Andersonized” version of Buchanan.   
 Having grounded the right to democracy in a particular rights theory, I turn to a 
demonstration of how IU supports not simply rights in general, but the narrower and 
more controversial category of human rights.  I do so by first addressing the question of 
what is meant by the term ‘human rights’ by presenting the work of James Nickel, before 
showing how IU can furnish human rights that meet Nickel’s criteria.  As with Nelson, I 
treat Nickel’s account as a defensible elaboration on the work of John Stuart Mill.   
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 Having presented the arguments on which my position on democracy as a human 
right depends, and defined the main terms employed by this position, I turn to the 
exposition of my main argument: that IU supports a human right to democratic 
governance.  I then present Joshua Cohen’s argument that the right to democratic 
governance is not a human right, and reply to this position.  This reply will have three 
main parts.  The first will be to argue that Cohen’s definition of democracy is inferior, by 
reference to Bill Nelson’s evaluation of accounts of the form Cohen’s definition takes.  
The second part of my reply to Cohen attempts to answer his concern that considering the 
right to democratic governance to be a human right jeopardizes democracy’s particularly 
‘demanding’ nature.  The third part of my reply to Cohen is a critique of the Rawlsian 
ideas Cohen references, most prominently Rawls’ arguments regarding what it is 
reasonable to expect agreement upon in global public reasoning.  In essence, I will argue 
that the way forward in disagreement between peoples can be through appeal not to 
commonality of values, but to commonality of the reasons that support them.  Here my 
discussion will reference the work of Akeel Bilgrami.  Having addressed Cohen and 
Rawls, I turn to other theorists, whose work presents variations upon Rawls’ and Cohen’s 
themes.   
 The structure of my dissertation is as follows.  In Chapter 2, I present William 
Nelson's definition of and justification for democracy.  I follow this with an exposition of 
the theory of deliberative democracy advanced by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 
which I argue can serve as an elaboration of Nelson's democratic theory.   
 In Chapter 3, I present Lyons’ Indirect Utilitarian theory (as elaborated by Brandt 
and Railton), and explain how it functions.  Here I make the case that IU can serve as a 
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ground for rights claims.   
 In Chapter 4, I present a promising argument for a human right to democratic 
governance – that of Allen Buchanan – and demonstrate how it stands in need of 
elaboration.  I will attempt to demonstrate how involving the conception of equality 
defended by Elizabeth Anderson and others improves Buchanan’s account.   
 In Chapter 5, I show how IU supports human rights, first by defining the term 
‘human rights’ using the work of James Nickel, and then by showing how IU can furnish 
human rights that meet Nickel’s criteria.  I aim to demonstrate how this account improves 
on Nickel’s theory.  I then address the main question, and build upon the arguments from 
the previous chapters to make the case for a human right to democratic governance.  I 
then present Joshua Cohen’s case for a negative reply to the main question and respond to 
Cohen’s argument.  Doing so requires that I address the work of John Rawls, which I will 
do in part by appealing to the work of Akeel Bilgrami.  I then present the more recent 
work of other theorists whose positions present variations upon Rawls’ and Cohen’s 
themes. 
 
Buchanan’s Project and the Iraq Problematic 
 Allen Buchanan’s endeavor to establish a normative grounding for international law 
posits democracy as a human right, but one contingent upon its enabling the protection of 
more fundamental security rights.  Making political rights contingent upon security rights 
is potentially problematic for the attempt to establish political equality, since there is 
insufficient argumentation in a defense of security rights to support political rights, as I 
attempt to demonstrate in part by appeal to the political situation currently faced by 
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women in Iraq.   
 I propose the following problematic as a way of illustrating my theoretical 
argument.  The example case concerns the current political situation in Iraq. I intend to 
show that while Islamic law (Shari’a) provides equal security rights for women, it does 
not provide equal political rights.  It is thus a problem case for post-Rawlsian views that 
would see Iraq as a minimally decent society, as well as for views such as Buchanan’s 
which base political participation rights on security rights. In this section I will first 
substantiate the claim that Shari’a involves a tendency to define gender roles that assign 
unequal political rights to women, and then attempt to demonstrate how the case of Iraq 
is problematic for Buchanan.   
 According to a study by the United States Institute of Peace, “Islamism...is destined 
to play a major role in the future of Iraqi politics.”9  Many Islamist regimes are 
characterized by denial of women’s social and political rights.  This issue thus arises with 
each new possibility of a regime that is subject to the influence of Islamic law. A 
development in January 2009 – in which guarantees that at least 25 percent of 
Parliamentary seats would be set aside for women that were included in earlier versions 
of Iraqi election law were excluded from the law’s published version – demonstrates the 
frailty of the constitutional safeguards placed against such exclusion.10 
 Let us treat as a hypothesis the claim that security rights for women in Islamic 
societies appear roughly equal to those of men.11  Thus under Shari’a Iraqi women have 
equal security rights, but they are likely to have unequal political rights.12  Article 2 of the 
Iraqi constitution reads 
First: Islam is the official religion of the State and it is a fundamental source of 
legislation: 
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 A. No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be  
      established. 
 B. No law that contradicts the principles of democracy may be established. 
 C. No law that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this 
          constitution may be established. 
 
It is possible that the patriarchal tendency of Islam will deny women political rights. A 
sufficient number of the citizens of Iraq may be willing to accept this, as a result of their 
placing greater value on religious interests. In addition, the proscription of such a 
development by Iraqi political institutions can count as religious persecution, since it 
denies Iraqi citizens the freedom to live in accordance with their religious beliefs. While 
the perils to women’s political rights represented in article 2A are provided for in article 
2C,13 the “established provisions of Islam” are likely to reflect that culture’s curtailment 
of the political rights of women, which means that these two articles are likely to come 
into conflict with one another at some point.  What will result from this conflict is 
anyone’s guess, but the prospects are dim for women’s rights, given that the allegiance of 
most Iraqi citizens to their religious leaders seems to be stronger than that to the current 
government.   
 In Chapter 2, I present the definition of and justification for democracy, as 
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 In order to defend the claim that the right to democratic governance is a human 
right, I must first specify what I mean by ‘democracy’.  (In Chapter 5, I will also specify 
what I mean by a human right.)  The conditions on a system of government’s counting as 
democratic remain a matter of dispute, but are in part determined by the particular 
justification offered for a candidate definition of democratic government.1  The reasons 
for supporting features such as the separation of powers, periodic voting, and protection 
of minorities will derive from the justification, the requirements of which are expressed 
in a particular definition.   
Theories of democracy vary widely, so thorough discussion of the topic requires 
some extensive house-sorting, if one is to make the case for a superior conception of 
democracy.  To do so I turn first to William Nelson’s survey of democratic theories that 
conveniently sorts the multitude of theories into broad categories for evaluation.  In this 
chapter I will set out a version of democracy that combines Nelson’s with Gutmann and 
Thompson’s deliberative approach. The account I develop is open government in the 
deliberative sense. I plan thereby to have equipped myself with a workable definition of 
democracy for my main discussion regarding its viability as a human right.   
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The right to which I read Nelson as defending is defined, in part, as requiring 
particular institutional arrangements – ones that aim at certain core values.  These 
institutional arrangements include such commonly-cited features as: the free, fair, and 
frequent election of officials; freedom of expression; a variety of information sources; 
protection of minorities; and autonomy of association.  Whether or not these institutional 
arrangements are sufficient to support maintenance of a system of democracy that 
satisfies Nelson’s definition, however, is determined by whether they further the core 
values Nelson specifies.  The values at which they aim are: the improvement of the moral 
character of a society’s citizens, such that the interests of others are more likely to be 
weighed; that given conflicting claims, citizens seek something beyond mere self-interest, 
via the application of principles and maxims that aim at the common good.  I elaborate 
these further, below.   
 
A Survey of Democratic Theories  
 In his On Justifying Democracy, William Nelson assesses a number of democratic 
theories as insufficient to the task of making a moral case for the superiority of 
democratic governance over other kinds.  I will offer a synopsis of his criticism before 
presenting his positive theory.  Nelson’s approach is to consider accounts of democracy 
in light of the adequacy of the justifications offered for them.  In developing his account 
of democracy, Nelson rules out some candidate definitions because of clear problems 
with their justification.     
 The first theory Nelson criticizes is majoritarianism, by which democracy is 
justified simply because it confers decisional authority to voting majorities.  That is, 
! 16!
majoritarianism is justified exclusively by appeal to the principles of anonymity and 
neutrality as standards of fairness in democracy. Anonymity and neutrality, the 
majoritarian argument goes, confer fairness on decisions.  Decision by majority rule is 
anonymous, in that it is unaffected by who votes on one side or the other.  It is neutral in 
that every proposal has a chance of winning – the majority need simply choose it.   
 Majoritarianism thus has a purely proceduralist justification, because it operates 
independently of the decisions that result.  This is exactly the fault Nelson finds with such 
a theory, since specification of independent standards regarding outcomes is possible.  
Thus anonymity and neutrality, standing alone, are compatible with unjust outcomes, 
such as unequal protection of rights.  As Peter Singer argues, “equal rights to a cake 
would not be satisfied if the majority walked off with the whole cake.”2  If outcomes 
matter morally, a justification that does not take them into account is thereby insufficient, 
and along with it the specification of democracy as simply majoritarianism.   
 Nelson next addresses the participation theory of democracy.  Participation 
theorists also argue that democratic justice is a purely procedural matter, since 
participation is intrinsically desirable, independent of consequences.  Thus as long as the 
decision procedure satisfies the criterion of participation, it is just.  The aim of 
democracy, under this theory, is a ‘participatory society’ in which individuals exercise 
maximum possible control over their own lives and environment.  Under participation 
theory, policy should result from extensive, informed debate, with officials serving as 
agents of the public, as represented by a majority vote.   
 While Nelson acknowledges the importance of participation, he points out a 
number of problems with it as a justification for democracy.  The first of these is that by 
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this theory, whether or not a political system counts as democratic depends on the degree 
to which citizens make use of the system.  Nelson argues that it is more plausible, when 
evaluating a system, to evaluate the system itself, rather than its degree of use.  While 
particular decisions may be characterized as more or less democratic in virtue of the 
degree of participation they involve, it seems that the conditions for a political system’s 
counting as democratic are met in constitutional provisions, rather than in to what degree 
people choose to make use of the system provided.  This is because, as Nelson argues, 
participation theorists must count a system which (at least over time) involves low levels 
of participation as nondemocratic – however, if participation is but one variable among 
others, “maintenance of an optimal level of democracy, over the long run, may actually 
require a low level of participation.”3   
 Another problem Nelson finds with participation theory is that, as a purely 
procedural standard, participation is open to the same criticism over unjust outcomes as is 
majoritarianism, and is thus insufficient for the same reason.  Participation by itself is 
insufficient to blunt the choice of decisions that are seriously unjust. 
 Nelson’s third reason for rejecting the available participation theories is that they 
fail to articulate just why a society with greater participation is morally better.  He argues 
that the following three interpretations of participation all fail: consent, equality, and 
promotion of virtue.   
 Reading participation as representing the consent of the governed – as does Peter 
Singer – is problematic, Nelson, says, since there’s no clear reason to think that those on 
the losing side of a vote consent to the decision made.  Without an account of how the 
losing side consents, there can be no appeal to this interpretation as the standard by which 
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democracy is justified.  Singer supports the view that regardless of outcome, participation 
in voting represents “quasi-consent,” which as a matter of convention operates as consent 
proper.  Participants who do not declare the intention to respond to unfavored outcomes 
with disobedience generate legitimate expectations on the part of other participants, and 
thereby incur an obligation to accept the outcome.  
 Nelson replies to Singer's argument by presenting a thought experiment.  
Suppose, Nelson proposes, that voting takes place as it ordinarily does – in a highly 
structured institution (the state), and that it concerns laws and policies to be coercively 
enforced.  In such a case, and presuming that the relevant state officials took themselves 
as bound by the result, Nelson reasons, the effect of voting would be much the same, 
even if participants generally did not view themselves as consenting to the election result.  
They would, Nelson says “simply realize that they would be stuck with the results of the 
election, and that they consequently ought to try to influence it.”4  That is, voting would 
still have a point, with people taking the cynical attitude that they are stuck with the 
decision, but not that they consent.  Thus the conceptual connection between voting and 
consenting that Singer proposes appears unsupported.   
 The standard of participation might also be interpreted as securing the equality of 
an important right.  As Carl Cohen argues, “[c]itizens have a right to an equal voice in 
decisions that significantly affect them all.”5  Thus participation is important, the idea 
goes, because through it, all are granted a certain kind of equal standing.  However, 
Nelson argues, people make unilateral decisions all the time that significantly affect 
others, as in the cases of parenting, land ownership, employment, and the selection of 
spouses.  That is, many decisions are made by individuals that affect other individuals 
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significantly, yet such decisions are not considered to violate equality of rights.   So, 
Nelson reasons, any right to an equal voice in decisions that significantly affect all 
citizens is subject to contextually determined limits, and some of these may inveigh on 
political procedure.  Reasoning thusly, Nelson objects that the very broadness of the 
justifying principle – that people have the right to an equal voice in decisions that 
significantly affect them all – while providing the sought-after answer in some political 
contexts, can lead to counterintuitive results when applied in others.   
Nelson then turns to democracy as popular sovereignty.  According to this theory, 
democracy is justified because its decision procedure grants authority to ‘the will of the 
people’.  The simplest elaboration of this notion, Nelson says, is that what people think 
ought to be done, is done by the state.  But this explanation is itself subject to further 
inquiry.  One problem is that when we look to “the people,” we find only individuals, 
many of whom disagree with one another.  But the more fundamental problem with the 
notion of ‘the will of the people’, Nelson argues, is that there is no functioning definition 
of this notion, and none seems possible, since the only apparent alternatives – appeals to 
either autonomy or liberty – both fail to be practical.  Where ‘the will of the people’ is 
rooted in appeals to autonomy, legitimacy means that those subject to a political system’s 
de jure authority are also morally obligated to acquiesce in this authority.  However, if we 
define legitimacy thusly, and also claim that all have a fundamental obligation to be 
autonomous (c.f. Kant), there is a conflict of authority, unless unanimity obtains.  Since 
such a formulation of ‘the will of the people’ requires a unanimous standard, Nelson 
reasons, it is impractical.   
! 20!
Where ‘the will of the people’ is rooted in appeals to liberty, theorists utilize the 
standard that where morality is silent, government decisions must respect the freedom of 
its citizens by according with their choices.  However, such a formulation also seems to 
require unanimity, since in those places where morality is silent, government must not 
coerce anyone to act against her wishes in these areas.  On these grounds, Nelson  
concludes that liberty-based interpretations of 'the will of the people' are also impractical.   
Another group of democratic theories Nelson criticizes are economic 
justifications.  Such theories, though they vary widely, are characterized by three 
common elements: 1. an abstract deductive character; 2. the assumption of rational utility 
maximization by individuals; 3. operation on a market model (i.e., amalgamation of 
individual preferences to determine a set of policy decisions).  The problem with such 
theories, Nelson argues, is that desires do not appear intrinsically worthy of satisfaction, 
yet their satisfaction is the standard to which economic justifications appeal.  Thus, 
Nelson argues, economic accounts lack the ability to provide moral justification for 
democracy.   
Of the various justifications for democracy, Nelson finds participation theory 
most plausible.  The interpretation of participation theory that most resembles Nelson’s 
own is that of Carole Pateman, who reads participation as promoting virtue.  Through the 
process of participation, Pateman explains, citizens develop such virtues as responsible 
character, group harmony, autonomy, and appreciation of alternative viewpoints.  The 
point of the participation theory of democracy, Pateman argues, is not the quality or kind 
of legislation produced, but a participatory society, which she defends as valuable in 
itself.  Stating Pateman's focus in this way, Nelson notes, can seem misleading, since on 
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Pateman's account a participatory society will positively affect the character of those 
involved, leading to more virtuous individuals.   
 Nelson's disagreement with this, he says, is not with the form of Pateman's 
argument, but rather with the details of it.  Nelson argues that the character traits in 
question are either not clearly eo ipso desirable, or are so only under the assumption that 
a participatory society is rightly sought.  Absent a full, independent justification for the 
desirability of the traits in question, Nelson says, this rationale for democracy is 
incomplete.  Pateman, he argues, does not offer any such independent justification – as it 
stands, he argues, her account is circular.  Without reference to some external account, 
the virtues extolled are not clearly desirable, independent of reference to participation.   
In his analysis of participation theory, Nelson's focus has been on the desirability 
of participation.  Among the various theories, he fails to find an account of why 
participation is desirable.  He formulates his own account by providing the missing 
independent moral framework, such that participation will make reference to a particular 
conception of the good, thereby rendering it immune to criticisms of circularity and mere 
proceduralism.  I turn now to Nelson’s positive account.   
 
Nelson's Theory: Democracy as Open Government 
 Nelson follows his assessment of the surveyed literature with his positive theory, 
that democracy is justified in virtue of the tendency of open government to produce just 
legislation.  His general criticism of the alternate theories of democracy is that they fail to 
treat the issue of justification seriously enough, in that they neglect reference to a theory 
of morality.  According to Nelson, a proper justification for any political system must 
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make reference to some account of morality – for if a political system purports to further 
some good, it must specify the nature of the good to which it refers.  I will first present 
his account of morality – which furnishes the independent moral framework he finds 
lacking in Carole Pateman's work – before presenting his justification for democracy: that 
government that is open (in the way he defines) tends to produce just legislation.   
Nelson explains that his account of morality is both minimal, in that it provides 
only some basic conditions, and functional, in that it specifies some of what must be done 
by a system of morality.6  Minimally, he argues, an adequate morality is a set of 
principles that has three properties:  
1. The principles must represent a system of rules proscribing harmful conduct/ 
ensuring beneficial conduct.   
2. The principles must be able to serve as the public, shared set of principles 
constituting a stable, fundamental charter of a well-ordered human 
association.   
3. The principles must be able to perform the function articulated in 2. in a 
society of free and independent persons.  (This involves two empirical 
assumptions: one, we are not genuinely indifferent to the opinions of others; 
two, it is costly and difficult to conceal one’s conduct.)   
 
Having formulated this minimal account of the moral system to which his justification for 
democracy appeals, he proceeds to the theory itself.   
Nelson characterizes his argument as Madisonian, in that it affirms that 
democracy is superior to other forms of government because it prevents tyranny.  Thus 
one effect at which his account will aim, as a minimal standard, is the prevention of rule 
by small minorities or individuals, a standard which involves the protection of individual 
rights.  So one standard to which Nelson’s account will hold outcomes is whether rights 
are protected.  Such protection supports the proscribing of harmful conduct, a condition 
of the first principle in Nelson’s account of morality.   
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Nelson’s approach also incorporates the work of John Stuart Mill.  With Mill, 
Nelson argues that that form of government is best in itself which, given propitious 
circumstances, produces the best effects.  This production of good effects, Nelson 
reasons, stems from a central feature of Millian democracy, namely that it improves the 
moral character of its citizens.  Through the exercise of democratic government, 
individuals required to serve on juries or in office are compelled “to weigh interests not 
his own; to be guided, in the case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private 
partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of 
existence the common good.”7  This compulsion to develop one's individual moral 
capacity, coupled with the open nature of democratic government, furnishes Mill with 
reasons to claim that democracy tends to produce results that are more morally defensible 
than its alternatives.  These values, then, are the core at which the institutional 
arrangements required by Nelson’s definition of democracy aim.   
However, Nelson notes, Mill does not limit his justification of democracy solely 
to the tendency for improvement of the moral character of its citizens; Mill also roots his 
justification for democracy in a substantive moral theory:  
[Mill] does evaluate institutions in part by their effects on character, but a moral 
theory – utilitarianism – serves as the foundation of the argument.  Without such 
a foundation, the argument would be radically incomplete.  It would rest, as does 
Pateman’s argument, on a merely conventional list of vaguely specified 
‘democratic’ character traits.  We need to go further than that.8   
 
This argument from Nelson prompts mention of my intention to show how his arguments 
justifying democracy can be read as a possible elaboration of Mill.  I will also argue that, 
as an elaboration of another aspect of Mill’s work, Lyons’ formulation of IU (as 
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interpreted in light of the work of Richard Brandt and of Peter Railton) can serve as an 
elaboration on the substantive moral theory called for by Nelson.  More on this, shortly.   
Like Mill, Nelson broadly characterizes democracy as representative government, 
but he reasons that the feature of democracy – whether direct or representative – most 
important for the just results he has in mind (such as the protection of rights) is that it is 
open.  By “open,” Nelson means that administrators and legislators are forced to defend 
their actions publicly.  In meeting this condition, Nelson reasons that administrators and 
legislators must formulate principles with justifications that are both coherent and likely 
to gain widespread acceptance.  Such justifications tend to result in legislation that meets 
the standards articulated in the second and third principles of Nelson’s theory of morality.  
These latter two principles express conditions justified by Rawlsian notions of public 
reasoning.  Rawls’ well-ordered society is governed by common principles that result 
from agreement through public reason – principles which can serve as the fundamental 
charter with which citizens can be expected to comply.   
 According to Nelson's justification of democracy, then, political openness leads to 
just legislation, which is defined in part as the protection of rights deemed appropriate 
through the process described in the second and third principles of Nelson’s theory of 
morality.  Laws that pass the test of public justifiability tend to be just because open 
government, in yielding policy proposals that must be both coherent and capable of 
gaining widespread acceptance, tends to produce just legislation, an important aspect of 
which is the prevention of tyranny through the protection of rights.   
In Chapter 3, I aim to demonstrate that Nelson's sense of openness is justified by 
IU.   Nelson argues for his definition of democracy as superior to its alternatives, for the 
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reason that it tends to yield the most moral results.  Since this definition is consonant with 
the substantive moral theory I present in the following chapter – Indirect Utilitarianism 
(which, in turn, satisfies Nelson’s minimalist requirements for a system of morality) – I 
will treat Nelson’s definition of democracy as a viable elaboration of David Lyons’ 
reading of John Stuart Mill.   
I follow Nelson in defining democracy as a system that makes available the 
means to participate in a government that is open, in the ways he specifies.  (The 
institutional arrangements required by the maintenance of such a system, as I’ve noted, 
will include such commonly-cited features as: the free, fair, and frequent election of 
officials; freedom of expression; a variety of information sources; and autonomy of 
association.)  I will thus state the right I have in mind as the right to participate in a 
system of government that is open (i.e., public, with administrators and legislators forced 
to defend their actions publicly).  For further specification of what “openness” requires 
for the account of democracy I will be employing, I turn to Gutmann and Thompson’s 
deliberative model.  
 
Gutmann and Thompson’s Deliberative Model 
The term ‘deliberative democracy’ has had many uses, some of which are 
incompatible with one another, and many of which would benefit from further 
clarification.  In their Democracy and Disagreement, Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson advance an apparently simple thesis: that when citizens or their 
representatives disagree morally, they ought nevertheless to persevere in reasoning 
together to reach mutually acceptable decisions.  The simplicity is in appearance only, for 
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the implications of the main idea are, as they demonstrate, quite complex.  The 
methodology they articulate in spelling out the implications of their main thesis forms the 
body of their version of deliberative democracy.   
The domain in which their method operates, they explain, is the neglected 
midrange of abstraction in ethics between the micro level – assessment of individual acts, 
which involves institutional rules – and the macro level – theories of justice, which 
involve the delineation of the basic structures of an ideal society, such as its foundational 
principles.  This method does so by positing a process in which deliberators shift back 
and forth between general principles and judgments regarding particular circumstances, 
modifying each in light of the other, rather than trying to impose the elements of one 
domain unidirectionally, to yield judgments in the other.  Their argument focuses on what 
must be prior to any empirical investigation into whether deliberative democracy is 
superior to its alternatives – namely, the clarification of deliberation itself – and is thus 
not itself an empirical argument.   
 
The Persistence of Moral Disagreement 
Gutmann and Thompson argue that while political disagreement takes many 
forms, the most intractable political disagreements are moral.  For argument to count as 
moral, it must exhibit certain characteristics.  Minimally, they say, this includes the 
characteristic of generality – arguments that are moral apply to all individuals who are 
similarly situated.  In addition to this most basic characteristic of moral arguments are 
those of reciprocity, publicity, and accountability.  Given their great importance in 
political disagreement, these latter three will represent the main principles of deliberative 
! 27!
democracy.  In Chapter 3, I aim to demonstrate that the moral claims made by Gutmann 
and Thompson are consonant with IU.   
Gutmann and Thompson explain that deliberative democracy aims to operate 
within actual, rather than ideal, societies.  They expect that citizens will be encouraged to 
take their opponents’ moral claims more seriously, if they avoid concluding (by thought 
experiment) that fellow citizens would agree on moral matters, if only the discussion took 
place within an ideal society.  Rather than claiming that the results of all actual 
deliberation are just, the authors argue that the more closely the conditions of deliberative 
democracy are met, the more justifiable the results will be.   
Gutmann and Thompson give four reasons for the persistence of moral 
disagreement: scarcity, limited generosity, incompatible values, and incomplete 
understanding.  Brief elaboration of each of these follows.  They argue that since moral 
disagreement is rightly expected to persist, due to these factors, a process such as is 
indicated by their theory offers the best chance at the resolution of moral conflict.   
The authors reference David Hume’s claim that the facts of scarcity of resources 
and limited generosity are the only sources of moral conflict, agreeing that these are 
indeed to be included, but that they form an incomplete list of the sources of moral 
conflict.  They note that Thomas Hobbes makes a similar claim, when he attributes all 
moral conflict to self-interest.  Gutmann and Thompson find such claims overly 
reductionistic.   
In their counterargument to such claims, an example they note is the fact that 
those who would incur loss of wealth from a tax increase nevertheless favor it in many 
cases, in order to increase social security revenues.  They argue that an answer to this 
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example that accounted for such phenomena by expanding the notion of self-interest to 
include such things as the upholding of rights, fair treatment of those one cares about, and 
so on, deprives the charge of self-interest of its critical content: if all action is motivated 
solely by self-interest, the reduction of moral conflict to self-interest is a truism.  The 
authors also cite Brian Barry, who argues that since the equation of self-interest with 
rationality is pure assertion, the claim is subject to counter-assertion, that impartiality is 
rational.  In the absence of further argument, he concludes, there is no reason to assent to 
the equation of self-interest with rationality.   
Gutmann and Thompson thus argue that two additional sources of moral conflict 
must be acknowledged, namely the incompatibility of values and the incompleteness of 
understanding.  These two sources have a mutually supporting relationship, the authors 
explain.  Values supported by sustained arguments stand in many instances in direct 
opposition to one another.  The authors explain that while the reasons that support values 
are evaluable as superior or inferior to one another – such that moral conflict based on 
incompatible values alone may be in theory resolvable – the fact of incomplete 
understanding (to which all individuals are subject) reliably prevents such resolution.  
While the authors’ claim that moral conflict cannot be avoided may be too strong, the 
weaker claim that it is virtually guaranteed works sufficiently in the context of their 
broader arguments.  Having made the case for the persistence of moral conflict, they turn 





Democratic Responses to Persistent Moral Disagreement 
Gutmann and Thompson characterize democracy as a conception of government 
that accords equal respect to the moral claims of each citizen, and is, in virtue of this 
feature, morally justifiable from the perspective of each citizen.  They argue that if moral 
disagreement is intractable, it is best to live in a situation in which the moral status of 
each is respected to the greatest degree possible.  Thus, they reason, given the persistence 
of moral conflict, democratic solutions are superior to alternatives.  They evaluate the 
two dominant accounts of democracy before presenting their own.   
Like Nelson, Gutmann and Thompson find pure proceduralism lacking.  
According to procedural democracy, the only expression of citizens as political equals is 
majority rule, simply because minority rule fails to be such an expression.  Proceduralists 
affirm only those rights necessary for democratic procedures, and look only to whether 
the political procedures involved are fair in determining whether a political system is 
justifiable.   
Constitutionalists, on the other hand, affirm not only those rights necessary for 
democratic procedures, but also those aimed at just outcomes.  Constitutionalism, then, is 
the position that both rights to proper procedure and rights that minimize unjust outcomes 
are required by democracy.  Gutmann and Thompson argue that since a basic condition 
of morality–reciprocity–is not satisfied in cases in which the basic liberties or 
opportunities of an individual are not protected, and that majority rule, taken alone, 
permits such outcomes, proceduralism cannot suffice in conferring moral legitimacy to a 
political system.  However, they also argue that constitutionalism does not provide a full 
account of democracy.  Since constitutionalists, no less than proceduralists, require 
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morally justified procedures for arriving at politically binding decisions – and do so most 
often by turning to majority rule – they must find a suitable form, and in doing so they 
move toward deliberative democracy.  
Deliberative democracy rejects the premise, shared by both proceduralists and 
constitutionalists, that either process or substance must have priority.  Deliberation, they 
argue, is outcome-oriented: citizens deliberate with the aim of justifying collective 
decisions to one another, as best they can.  The outcome sought here is the maximizing of 
agreements among participants who reliably represent fundamentally differing views in  
an environment of persistent moral disagreement.  The relationship between procedures 
and outcomes is dynamic, on their model, and neither has priority.  Having made their 
case for greater prominence of deliberation in the democratic process, they present their 
theory.   
 
Six Principles of Deliberative Democracy  
Gutmann and Thompson divide their list of principles in two.  Three principles 
(reciprocity, publicity, and accountability) represent conditions for the regulation of 
deliberation.  Three others (basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity) 
represent key components of the content of deliberation.  In accordance with reciprocity, 
citizens offer reasons for their preferred direction in collective decisions – ones that 
others, similarly situated, are more likely to accept, even though they realize they have 
only some values in common.  In doing so, citizens exhibit mutual respect as moral 
agents.  Through appeal to shared reasons, the authors argue, deliberation offers greater 
promise in finding resolution to moral conflict.  Failing such resolution, deliberation that 
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appeals to shared reasons tends to produce decisions that are more widely acceptable, and 
as such are less likely to be the source of political discord.  A prominent standard of 
reciprocity, as the authors conceive it, is that empirical claims be consistent with reliable 
methods of inquiry, the aim of which is to provide a less divergent pool of facts to which 
deliberation can appeal.   
By the principle of publicity, discussion takes place, not simply between two 
interlocutors, but before all citizens.  The authors offer four reasons why publicity is 
essential to justifiable government.  First, only public justifications are available for 
consent by all citizens.  Second, making justifications public contributes to the 
broadening of moral and political perspectives.  Third, publicity more than secrecy serves 
as a proper expression of mutual respect.  Fourth, the self-correcting character of 
deliberation – by which citizens are encouraged to consider changing their minds – is 
impeded, absent access to the reasons for the available alternatives.   
Last among the authors’ regulatory principles, accountability entails more than 
securing re-election and respecting constitutional rights.  In deliberative democracy, 
representatives are expected to justify their actions in moral terms.  Representatives are 
accountable ultimately to citizens, and this standard entails such duties as offering well-
formulated replies to criticism.  This regulatory principle concerns the relationship 
between those offering justification and those to whom it is offered.  Accountability is 
thus an issue of agency, in contrast with publicity’s being a issue of forum.   
The three principles of deliberative democracy that represent key components of 
the content of deliberation are basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity.  
These constitutional principles aim at limiting the permissible consequences yielded by 
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the process described in the authors' regulatory principles.  In the principle of basic 
liberty, the authors have in mind the Millian conception, which is based on bodily and 
mental integrity (“Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign”9), appropriately tempered by considerations of paternalism and moralism.  
What constitutes appropriate tempering of liberty, the authors argue, is to be determined 
through a process of deliberation that focuses on enhancing personal integrity, since this 
interest can be furthered in some instances when paternalistic and moralistic 
considerations curtail absolute liberty.    
The principle of basic opportunity expresses the notion that citizens ought to have 
secured for them an adequate level of goods necessary for a decent life, in the society in 
which they are situated.  “The essential point,” they argue, “is that citizens should not be 
denied basic opportunities on the basis of factors for which they are not responsible.”10   
In this way, Gutmann and Thompson argue, the effects of the morally arbitrary 
distribution of goods and talents might be mitigated.   
The principle of fair opportunity grants individuals the possibility of an equal 
chance of improving their situation:   
The principle holds that government should ensure that each citizen has a fair 
chance to secure opportunity goods such as advanced education and skilled 
employment.  What the principle requires in practice depends on what fair 
opportunity means in the context of any particular opportunity good.11 
 
For example, in industrialized nations the issue of fair opportunity is raised by issues of 
preferential hiring and advancement in the workplace.  Through deliberation, the authors 
argue, purely meritocratic considerations should be balanced with efforts to end what 
morally indefensible discrimination persists in the society in question.   
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 By treating neither the content nor the regulation of deliberation as primary, 
Gutmann and Thompson argue, the deliberative aspect of democracy gains in 
prominence, leading to outcomes that stand a greater chance of assent by those subject to 
the resulting legislation.  Their six principles, taken in concert, present a promising 
approach toward this end.   
 
Democracy as Deliberation-based Open Government  
Following Nelson, I define openness in government as involving the public 
defense of administrators’ and legislators’ actions.  Following Gutmann and Thompson, I 
define deliberation-based democracy as characterized by their six principles.  The 
principles that Nelson specifies as constituting democracy as open government seem 
entirely consonant with those of Gutmann and Thompson.  Since both aim at the public 
defensibility of positions taken regarding governance, I will treat Gutmann and 
Thompson's theory as an elaboration of Nelson's more fundamental justification of 
democracy.  Granted that Gutmann and Thompson’s deliberative democracy can serve as 
an elaboration of the more general account offered by Nelson, I will proceed using this 
hybrid model I will hereafter refer to as “democracy as deliberation-based open 
government” (or simply “my version of democracy”).  Thus the definition of the right to 
democracy I defend is a right to participate in a political system that is open in the ways 
Nelson, Gutmann, and Thompson specify.     
 I turn next to an account of David Lyons’ Indirect Utilitarian theory, and explain 
how it functions.  There I make the case that IU can serve as a ground for rights claims, 
in addition to undergirding my arguments about democracy I have made in the present 
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chapter.  I will treat Nelson’s definition of democracy as a viable elaboration of David 
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 Utilitarianism is notorious for its inability to accommodate substantive rights.  In 
particular, the aggregation of utility that is central to less sophisticated versions of the 
theory yields implausible moral judgments, with respect to the treatment of individuals.  
In this paper, I remain silent on the issue of the superiority of any particular normative 
theory over rival systems.  My aim here is to demonstrate that utilitarianism – properly 
formulated – can suffice as a ground for rights claims, a task for which it is commonly 
dismissed as a viable theoretical candidate.   
 The proper treatment of individuals is a priority around which most accounts of 
rights are formulated.  For this reason any normative theory that fails to adequately 
account for rights is–to the degree to which it fails– seen as flawed by rights theorists.  
For instance, suppose – as in the common example – Dr. X, following utilitarian 
reasoning, harvests the organs of an otherwise healthy patient, in order to transplant her 
vital organs to five other patients who would otherwise die.  In such a case, the utilitarian 
aggregation of good appears to recommend the organ harvesting, whereas considered 
moral judgment concludes that the healthy patient thereby suffers a serious injustice.  If 
these two considerations cannot be reconciled, this speaks ill of utilitarianism's viability 
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as a normative theory, according to rights theorists.   
 In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate how utilitarianism, when construed in a 
specified manner, can provide a plausible account of substantive rights.  The argument I 
present here will not constitute a free-standing defense of utilitarianism's superiority over 
rival normative theories.  Instead, this argument is an attempt to show how a normative 
theory that is commonly dismissed as a candidate foundation for rights-claims can, in 
fact, plausibly account for substantive rights.   
 
Forms of Utilitarianism 
 The merits of act utilitarianism include the provision of definitive answers to 
moral questions, by way of measurement of the factors that are relevant to whatever 
moral question is at issue.  However, the aggregation and direct application employed by 
act utilitarianism undermines the theory in the judgment even of many who are 
sympathetic to it, as demonstrated in the example of Dr. X.  As a result, augmentations of 
utilitarian theories have been undertaken, and a distinction is made between act and rule 
utilitarianism.  Act utilitarianism is the simplest form of utilitarianism, in that it applies 
the calculus of aggregation directly to individual acts. Rule utilitarianism, by contrast, is 
intended to overcome objections of the kind demonstrated above, by positing utilitarian 
aggregation at one remove.  Under rule utilitarianism, the calculus does not apply to 
individual acts, but instead to the rules by which individual acts are evaluated.  So it's 
impermissible, under rule utilitarianism, to harvest the tonsil patient's organs, because 
otherwise hospitals would come to resemble casinos, in that whether your health 
improves or vanishes altogether occurs as a function of whoever else happens to be under 
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care at that time, and also–crucially–who is on staff.  Since hospitals are where 
individuals go for health care, and trust in these institutions is eroded by outcomes such 
as that effected by Dr. X, utility is not maximized, since fewer will seek care where the 
expertise lies.  As a result, overall health will be reduced, which none prefer – hence non-
optimal utility, under rule utilitarianism.   
 
Indirect Utilitarianism  
 In the following sections, I aim to specify what I mean by the term ‘Indirect 
Utilitarianism’ (IU), and why I choose the particular meaning that I do.  One innovation 
in the defense of utilitarianism has been to appeal to generalized utility, the total effect of 
a hypothetical “everyone” performing a particular act.  We can understand generalized 
utility in a number of ways.  Two of these, so-coined by Richard Brandt, are acceptance 
rule utilitarianism (ARU) and obedience rule utilitarianism (ORU).  It is my intention to 
defend IU as interpreted under ARU.  To do so, I will appeal primarily to the work of 
John Stuart Mill, David Lyons, Richard Brandt, and Peter Railton.  In the following 
sections, I offer an account of what it means to interpret IU as ARU, and why I do so.  In 
short, I distinguish, following others, between the practical and critical levels of IU: that 
common actors at the practical level will follow rules as if behaving deontically, while at 
the critical level, the reasons for adopting a particular set of rules are spelled out in 
indirect utilitarian terms.  First, I must spell out why it is necessary to adopt a viable form 




Background of IU:  Extensional Equivalence 
 In Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, David Lyons addresses the claim that 
reference to generalized utility – a term for the basic appeal of the question “what are the 
consequences of everyone’s performing x?” (as opposed to the consequences of ‘one’s’ 
performing x) – yields a form of utilitarianism that is resistant to criticisms of act 
utilitarianism.  His arguments capably demonstrate that the distinction between act and (a 
certain form of) rule utilitarianism is a spurious one.  Lyons argues that act utilitarianism 
(AU) and generalized utility (GU) are extensionally equivalent.  By this, he means that 
once the actual utility of an act is multiplied by n iterations of the act, which constitutes 
the hypothetical “everyone's” performance of that same act, the actual utility of the act 
under the former (AU) and latter (rule-utilitarian, interpreted as referencing what happens 
when everyone obeys a particular rule) descriptions is quantitatively the same.  After 
some terminological clarification, Lyons' argument for this conclusion follows.   
Lyons argues that the correct description of a single act will include all its 
“general utilitarian properties,” the “causal properties in virtue of which the universal 
performance of acts of that kind would produce some utility or disutility.”1  By this he 
means that the proper description of a given act will offer a full account of those 
consequences which are measurable in terms of their utility.   
The causal property that concerns Lyons is the extent to which others’ 
performance of acts similar to the one in question influences some causal property of that 
act.  For example, if I am calling from New York to my friend in Scotland, my ringing 
his phone at time T depends upon whether the number of other New Yorkers calling 
Scotland are sufficient to overload the line capacity at T.  Thus, Lyons argues, the effect 
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of one’s act depends upon whether or not others perform the same act.  This dependency, 
Lyons argues, is a causal property of one’s act, and thus properly belongs to the 
description of that act.2   
 Lyons raises this point in order to draw a distinction between linear and non-
linear functions of utility.  With the former, the difference between the utilitarian 
properties of a single act and those of others’ performing the same act is a linear function, 
in that the act as performed by many will simply be some multiple of the utilitarian 
property of the single act.  For instance, if I drop a penny in a fountain, the utilitarian 
property of others doing the same is a function of the utilitarian property of the single act 
multiplied by the number of others who perform the same act.  So when only I perform 
the act, one penny enters the fountain, and when ninety-nine others perform the act, the 
number of pennies in the fountain will be a function of the number of individuals 
performing the same act, namely 100.  In this case, AU and GU are quantitatively 
identical.   
 Nonlinear functions of utility, on the other hand, result in utilitarian properties 
that are other than a sum of repetitions of the same act, as with my call to Scotland.  
Since in this case there is what Lyons calls a 'threshold effect' – there being at a certain 
time more calls than the telecommunications infrastructure can maintain – the function is 
nonlinear, in that the sum utility of all single calls is not equal to the total utility that 
results.  Thus the utilitarian property of my act is not simply a function of multiplying my 
act by some number of callers, since the net effect is other than that number of calls plus 
mine – it includes my inability to place the call.   
 In situations of linear functions of utility, there will be what Lyons calls 
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extensional equivalence between the sum utility of single acts and the total utility that 
results.  That is, the total utility (GU) and the sum of the utility of single acts (AU iterated 
n times) of a particular type will be equal.  With nonlinear functions, however, 
extensional equivalence does not obtain, since the total utility that results is not equal to 
the sum of the utility of single acts of a particular type.   
 However, Lyons argues, once the general utilitarian properties of single acts are 
properly accounted for, they will in fact include my inability to place the call.  Among the 
general utilitarian properties that Lyons argues properly belong to the description of a 
single act is a particular causal property, namely the extent to which others are 
performing the same action.  This causal property – the threshold effect – is the lynchpin 
by which Lyons shows that act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism (defined as 
evaluating rules by looking to what happens when everyone acts in accordance with a 
particular rule) are extensionally equivalent.   
 Lyons argues that the threshold effect of a particular act belongs to the proper 
description of that act's general utilitarian properties.  If this is the case, then the general 
utilitarian properties of a single act performed n times will be extensionally equivalent to 
the act's being performed under a rule-utilitarian description – by which a hypothetical 
“everyone” performs the act – since the general utilitarian properties under both 
descriptions share a linear relationship.  Thus the evaluation of acts will be extensionally 
equivalent under both act-utilitarian and rule-utilitarian descriptions.  If this is always the 
case – as Lyons argues it must be, granted the inclusion of threshold effects among an 
act's general utilitarian properties – then act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism (defined 
as above) are themselves extensionally equivalent.  And if this is so, Lyons concludes, 
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the distinction between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism collapses.  As a result, 
rule utilitarianism fails to overcome the same objections that present act utilitarianism as 
a nonviable ground for rights claims.   
 At the end of Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, however, Lyons distinguishes 
between two ways of construing GU via rule utilitarianism: one he dubs “specious” rule 
utilitarianism; the other “ideal” rule utilitarianism.  The former, he argues, leads to 
extensional equivalence, while the latter does not.  This distinction, I will argue, is 
analogous to Richard Brandt’s distinction between obedience rule utilitarianism and 
acceptance rule utilitarianism, which I elaborate below.  Unless one is able to formulate 
IU in such a way that renders it immune to the charge of extensional equivalence, IU 
cannot form the basis for the normative claims I aim to defend.   
 
Mill as Indirect Utilitarian 
 In Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory, Lyons formulates a version of 
utilitarianism that aims at overcoming the objections to prior forms, such as the 
extensional equivalence of act and rule utilitarianism.  His theory, he argues, constitutes a 
correct reading of John Stuart Mill's discussion of the relationship between rights and the 
principle of utility.  I will first offer some general descriptive comments regarding Lyons’ 
reading of Mill on rights, before proceeding to an account of how indirect utilitarianism 
(IU) functions.  The main feature of Mill’s theory emphasized by Lyons is the distinction 
between morality and expediency.  This distinction, Lyons explains, mirrors the 
relationship between justice and morality, in that not all cases of immoral behavior 
involve an injustice, which is a kind of immorality that involves the violation of a right.  
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Lyons cites the following text to support his claim that Mill intended such a distinction:   
We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to 
be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of 
his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. 
This seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple 
expediency.  ...This, therefore, being the characteristic difference which marks 
off, not justice, but morality in general, from the remaining provinces of 
Expediency and Worthiness; the character is still to be sought which 
distinguishes justice from other branches of morality.1 
 
That is, ‘unjust’ belongs to the category ‘immoral’, and ‘immoral’ belongs to the 
category ‘inexpedient’.  Since morality is a domain of expediency, conduct can be 
negatively appraised (as inexpedient) without condemning it as wrong (immoral).  Acts 
falling in this realm are inexpedient, since they fail to maximize utility, but Mill is not 
committed to calling them morally wrong.   
 Thus, Lyons argues, the principle of utility is not a moral principle, rather a 
principle of expediency.  The following statements by Mill regarding rights suggest the 
indirect nature of the principle of utility:   
When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid claim on 
society to protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that 
of education and opinion. If he has what we consider a sufficient claim, on 
whatever account, to have something guaranteed to him by society, we say that 
he has a right to it. If we desire to prove that anything does not belong to him by 
right, we think this done as soon as it is admitted that society ought not to take 
measures for securing it to him, but should leave him to chance, or to his own 
exertions.2 
 
This passage is followed immediately by Mill's statement that his sole recourse in the 
defense of this account of rights is appeal to “general utility.”5  Lyons argues that any 
interpretation of the relationship between these statements other than an indirect 
utilitarian account obviates the need for the entire fifth chapter of Utilitarianism and 
directly contradicts much of what is said there.3   
 Lyons reads Mill as committed to the priority of principles of justice.  That is, 
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principles of justice that protect interests – which in turn can be defended on utilitarian 
grounds – are the most important: “Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules 
which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more 
absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life.”7 Thus for Mill, Lyons 
argues, principles of justice – such as the provision of rights – cannot be trumped by 
other considerations, such as utility.   
 Given this, Lyons argues, Mill is not an act utilitarian.  For Mill, moral right and 
wrong are functions of moral rights and their correlative obligations, which are governed 
by principles of justice.  Expediency, on the other hand, is governed by the principle of 
utility.  According to Lyons’ reading of Mill, for something to be wrong, sanctions must 
be fitting, which for Mill means that a coercive rule can be justified by appeal to utility 
maximization, via the argument from interests, above.  Thus under IU, utilitarian 
reasoning applies to the choice of the best set of rules directly but regulates conduct itself 
only indirectly.  This, according to Lyons, precludes the theory’s vulnerability to two 
main rights-based objections to standard utilitarian accounts.   
The first of these is the ‘grounding problem’, which points out the difficulty 
standard utilitarian accounts have with grounding rights claims; if the maximization of 
utility is the basic ethical principle – as with standard utilitarian accounts – there seems to 
be no way to account for rights claims.   Under IU, however, accepting a principle is a 
matter of its benefits outweighing costs.  As a matter of principle, a right can be 
established, given an account that the absence of a given right is more costly than its 
general acceptance.  So, for example, the otherwise healthy student who arrives at the 
hospital for knee surgery is not in peril of having her vital organs harvested in order to 
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save five others from death under IU, since the cost of allowing such considerations 
would include a disastrous degree of erosion of public confidence in medical institutions.   
 The second rights-based objection to standard utilitarian accounts is the ‘trumping 
problem’, which specifies shortcomings in such accounts’ ability to preserve rights 
against welfare maximization.  While the grounding problem concerns the difficulty in 
basing rights claims in a system in which utility maximization seems inhospitable to 
assertions that an individual has a particular right, the trumping problem concerns the 
difficulty of maintaining rights as trumps over the utility principle in standard forms of 
utilitarianism.  However, under IU, considerations of marginal utility cannot infringe on 
rights, since utilitarian reasoning has no direct bearing on appraisal of conduct.  Again to 
the student with the knee injury.  Not only is it the case, under IU, that she benefits from 
a right against involuntary organ-harvesting, but such considerations simply do not apply, 
since utility maximization does not operate at so direct a level of analysis.   
 Having dealt with the grounding and trumping problems, Lyons proceeds to a 
general account of how an indirect utilitarian theory might function:   
Mill's general idea can be understood as follows.  We can distinguish three levels 
of normative concepts and judgments.  For present purposes, the bottom (most 
concrete) level concerns the rightness or wrongness, justice or injustice, morality 
or immorality of particular acts.  The intermediate, second level consists of moral 
principles, which concern (general) moral rights and obligations.  Judgments of 
right and wrong conduct at the bottom level are functions of moral rights and 
obligations, and of nothing else.  ...A particular act is right if and only if it does 
not breach a moral obligation, unless that obligation has been overridden by 
another obligation.  But moral principles are not self-certifying; they turn upon 
values they somehow serve (Mill is least clear about this relation).  The topmost 
level of normative concepts and judgments concerns the values that may be 
invoked to establish moral principles (which concern general moral rights and 
obligations).  For Mill, of course, the value at work at this topmost level is human 
happiness or welfare.  So, moral principles about general rights and obligations 
are supposed to have a direct relationship to the principle of utility.  But 
judgments concerning the rightness or wrongness of particular actions have no 
such relation.  Acts must be judged as right or wrong depending on whether they 




By ‘principles’, I take Lyons as referring to those principles of justice that protect 
important interests and, as such, garner high acceptance utility, such that any set of rules 
that neglects them will not qualify for candidacy as, on an IU account, the best (and thus 
correct) set of rules.  This stratification employed by IU provides the machinery requisite 
to overcoming the grounding and trumping problems, and provides the way for a 
utilitarian account of justice.  In the following sections, I will present a more detailed 
account of IU.   
 
Indirectness 
 The aspect of indirectness does not specify a particular theory.  Rather, it is a 
strategy of which a number of theories have partaken.  In consequentialism, indirectness 
means that in order to judge the moral rightness of some thing (an act, motive, or virtue, 
among others), we look to the consequences in terms of something other than the thing 
itself.  Contrast this with direct consequentialism, in which we look to the consequences 
of the thing (act, etc.) itself, in order to judge the moral rightness of that thing.   
 Among indirect consequentialist theories there is some variation, and the most 
common kind is (a proper formulation of) rule consequentialism.  Under rule 
consequentialism, the moral rightness of an act is determined by looking to the 
consequences of a rule.  These consequences can be measured in at least two different 
ways.  Recall that Lyons compares AU with GU, concluding that the two are 
extensionally equivalent.  This results from one of two ways of measuring the 
consequences of a set of rules, namely in terms of the consequences of everyone's 
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obeying that set of rules.  In his “Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism,” Richard 
Brandt formulates a first approximation of rule utilitarianism in the following way:  
An act is right if and only if it conforms with that set of general prescriptions for 
action such that, if everyone always did, from among the things which he could 
do on a given occasion, what conformed with these prescriptions, then at least as 
much intrinsic good would be produced as by conformity with any other set of 
general prescriptions.5   
 
Brandt points out that such a formulation looks to how people actually behave, in 
determining the rightness of a rule.  Following Lyons, he argues that formulating rule 
utilitarianism in this way allows its collapse into act utilitarianism, thus subjecting the 
theory to all criticisms to which act utilitarianism is subject.  Brandt argues that the 
reason this first approximation constitutes a specious form of rule utilitarianism is the 
directness of its appeal to consequences, in the determination of whether a rule is 
justifiable.   
Another way of measuring the consequences of a set of rules is in terms of the 
consequences of everyone's internalizing that set of rules.  These two ways of measuring 
the consequences of everyone's doing x (acting–in one way or the other–according to a 
set of rules) go by the names obedience rule consequentialism [ORC] and acceptance rule 
consequentialism [ARC].   
 Brandt formulates a version of acceptance rule consequentialism that appears 
immune to Lyons' criticism regarding extensional equivalence, in the following way:   
An act is right if and only if it conforms with that learnable set of rules the 
recognition of which as morally binding–roughly at the time of the act–by 
everyone in the society of the agent, except for the retention by individuals of 
already formed and decided moral convictions, would maximize intrinsic value.6   
 
By “the society of the agent,” Brandt explains that he is referring to “the largest area over 
which common rules can be adopted without loss of utility.”  By “except for the retention 
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by individuals of already formed and decided moral convictions,” Brandt is referring to 
[130.2] those felt obligations that reliably act as second-order rules that inveigh upon 
settling conflicts among first-order rules.  However, the most prominent feature of this 
formulation, for my purposes, is the way in which it is immune to the criticism of 
extensional equivalence.  Under ORC, a rule (or system of rules) is judged as justified or 
not, based upon the actual utility that results from following that rule (or system).  Under 
ARC, the number and complexity of rules is limited to that which can be accepted by a 
critical mass of individuals in the same society as the agent.  If the rules are not limited in 
this way, the cost of internalizing the rule set outweighs the benefit of adopting it, which 
means that that rule set is unjustifiable.  By limiting the set of rules in this way, the GU 
resulting from ARC is not equal to the resulting AU, thereby avoiding extensional 
equivalence and collapse.  So when we look to obedience utility, we measure the 
anticipated effects of everyone's doing x, which leads to collapse into act utilitarianism.  
When we look instead to acceptance utility, we avoid such collapse.   
 How might ARC appear, in practice?  In his “Alienation, Consequentialism, and 
the Demands of Morality,” Peter Railton distinguishes between subjective and objective 
consequentialism: under subjective consequentialism, actors consciously aim at the 
overall good, and the rightness of an act will be a function of what is seen by the actor as 
most reasonable; under objective consequentialism, Railton explains, “the criterion of the 
rightness of an act or course of action is whether it in fact would most promote the good 
of those acts available to the agent.”7  This distinction is what underlies the claim that 
there are practical and critical levels of IU.  Railton explains that  
an objective rule-consequentialist sets actual conformity to the rules with the 
highest acceptance value as his criterion of right action, recognizing the 
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possibility that the best set of rules might in some cases – or even always – 
recommend that one not perform rule-consequentialist deliberation.8   
 
By this, I read Railton as saying that given, on the one hand, that the criterion one applies 
to actors under ARC is not that agent’s own account of the utility involved, but rather the 
actual utility involved; and, on the other hand, that – under the best set of rules – 
consequentialist deliberation is not undertaken by the actor, that although the ethical 
system is consequentialist, the behavior of actors appears deontic.   
There is a problem with Railton’s formulation, since it references actual 
conformity to rules.  As we saw from Brandt’s discussion of ORC/ARC, referencing 
actual conformity to rules results in extensional equivalence between RU and AU.  
However, it appears possible to amend Railton’s formulation to say ‘an objective rule-
consequentialist sets acceptance of the rules with the highest acceptance value as his 
criterion of right action’, in which case we overcome this problem in Railton’s 
formulation.  As such, I will proceed under the premise that Brandt’s and Railton’s 
elaborations on IU permit an interpretation of IU, by which at the practical level appears 
deontic, while the critical level of analysis is indirect utilitarian.   
Distinguishing between the practical and critical levels of IU (by which common 
actors will follow rules as if behaving deontically, while at the critical level, the reasons 
for adopting a particular set of rules are spelled out in indirect utilitarian terms) allows 
me to refine what I take to be “indirect” in IU in the following way.  My use of the term 
‘indirect’ points out the indirect relationship between deontological acts and the good of 
GU.  Moral actors accept the best set of rules (with “best” cashed out as “best at 
maximizing GU”) – but they do not aim at GU, even though at the critical level the 
consequences of their accepting the best set of rules are revealed as maximizing GU, 
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hence ‘indirect’.   
 
How Indirect Utilitarianism Functions 
According to the sanction theory of moral obligation, which Lyons attributes to 
Mill, one has a moral obligation if a certain sort of rule could be justified.  So if a rule is 
in principle justifiable by appeal to general utility (contrast this with rule utilitarianism, in 
which rules are justified by direct appeal to general utility), moral obligations are thereby 
generated.  The way in which “direct appeal” and “in principle” differ here is this: when 
applying utilitarian calculus by direct appeal (to either acts or rules), one determines the 
rightness (or wrongness) of an act by immediate reference to the utility principle; if the 
utilitarian calculus is applied only in principle, then utility maximization applies only to 
the choice among sets of rules, and not to rules or acts themselves.   
On Mill’s account, Lyons argues, obligations of justice (which include respect for 
rights) are not absolute but may be overridden – but not by utility maximization, since 
this is not a moral commitment.  For Mill, to act unjustly is not simply to infringe a right, 
but to do so in the absence of an overriding right or obligation.  Thus on Lyons’ account 
Mill furnishes the mechanics by which rights are neither absolute nor overrideable 
directly by utility maximization.   
This account squares with the standard picture of rights as not absolute, but rather 
as subject to some limits – and these are often derived via consequentialist reasoning.  
Lyons explains that this account of the relationship between rights (in particular their 
potential to come into conflict with one another) functions in a fashion similar to that 
defended by Joseph Raz.  By Raz’s account, rights entail exclusionary reasons, which 
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operate as second-order reasons for excluding otherwise valid reasons for action from 
consideration.  So in the case of Dr. X, the right held by the knee surgery patient not to be 
killed represents an exclusionary reason that, regardless of direct utility maximization, 
preclude the harvesting of her organs.   
So by Lyons’ reading of Mill, to determine whether an act is just, one asks 
whether it violates a right.  In so doing, one asks whether a person should be protected 
from or guaranteed something, in a particular way, by reference to some important 
interest.  This is a question about an ideal social rule (n.b., thus far no mention of utility).  
To answer such questions, one must invoke substantive values, consequentialist or other.  
Thus, Lyons argues, taking rights seriously is not left optional by Mill.  To neglect rights 
(as, e.g., an act utilitarian does) is to confuse moral with instrumental value (i.e., to fail to 
acknowledge the morality/expediency distinction).  Under Mill’s theory, rights involve 
interests, and the interests served by the principle of justice that could be defended on 
utilitarian grounds are the most important.  Rights to security and freedom of action are 
seen by Mill as most vital, Lyons argues, and as such they correspond with the primary 
obligations of justice, and thus take precedence over all other obligations.   
Lyons finds an explicit grounding for rights claims in Mill’s provision for his 
principle of liberty:  
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually 
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is 
self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others.9 
 
From this Lyons proposes this variation on Mill's principle of liberty:  “The prevention of 
harm to other persons is a good reason, and the only good reason, for restricting 
 52 
behavior.”10  This “harm principle” functions like the principle of utility, only more 
narrowly: (1) it concerns harm to others, not welfare generally; and (2) it concerns 
coercion, not action generally.  Although freedom may be limited only for prevention of 
harm, the conduct interfered with need not itself be considered harmful to others (e.g., a 
requirement to give testimony in court).  From Mill’s principle of liberty, Lyons claims, 
further rights can be derived.  I will argue that democracy is among these.   
 Lyons’ reading of Mill is neutral with respect to the various contemporary 
accounts of rights (viz., claim, choice, and beneficiary):  “To have a right, then, is, I 
conceive, to have something that society ought to defend me in the possession of.  If the 
objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general 
utility.”11  Mill’s account of rights seems closest to claim theory (that rights are 
essentially claims), but is compatible with the other two accounts.  Thus IU is not 
vulnerable to controversies regarding the superiority of these competing views.   
Since the specified goal of the foregoing discussion is harm prevention, rights that 
protect individuals from harm will follow more or less directly from the hp argument.  I 
will argue that Bill Nelson’s conception of democracy, as tending to produce just 
legislation, is defendable by Lyons’ harm principle reading of Mill’s account of rights.   
 
Lyons’ Disavowal of Indirect Utilitarianism  
 Having done as much to account for a viable utilitarian theory of justice, Lyons 
appears to dismiss IU as employing conceptual claims that the relevant moral concepts 
cannot bear.  It is possible, he argues, for an agent dedicated to IU to resort to direct 
utilitarian reasoning.  Lyons argues that too much weight on utilitarian considerations 
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may be a moral error, but not a conceptual mistake:   
Consider, for example, our imaginary utilitarian official.  When he takes into 
account the effects of his conduct on human welfare while trying to decide what 
to do, he does not seem to be confused or to be violating the constraints of the 
moral concepts.  If he places too much weight upon direct utilitarian 
considerations, that may be a moral error, but it does not seem to be a conceptual 
mistake.  As a utilitarian, it seems incumbent on him to consider the effects of his 
conduct on welfare.  If so, we have no reason to believe that direct utilitarian 
considerations will not dominate his moral reasoning.  Thus, we have no reason 
to believe that satisfactory utilitarian theory of moral rights and obligations can 
be developed.  So we have no reason to believe that a utilitarian would be obliged 
to respect the moral force of justified legal rights and obligations.12 
 
As such, he argues, there is no guarantee that an agent dedicated to IU will not resort to 
direct utilitarian reasoning.  This reasoning follows from his thesis in Forms and Limits 
of Utilitarianism, that resort to the direct application of the principle of utility is 
inevitable under any form of utilitarianism.   
 Here I depart from Lyons' view.  To the contrary of his argument, I maintain that 
the placing of “too much”13 weight on utilitarian considerations is indeed a conceptual 
mistake.  Under IU, general welfare is the critical-level aim in all cases, yet aiming at it 
directly is just what gets us into trouble.  Consider the societal sanction against racial 
discrimination.  If a health care provider were to decide “I will not discriminate against 
this patient on the basis of her race” on a case-by-case basis, this seems wrong, since one 
thereby implicitly allows that each case involves a distinct decision to not discriminate on 
the basis of race.  If a decision is made in each instance, this implicitly allows for the 
decision to go the other way.  The sanction against racial discrimination is better 
formulated “I will not discriminate on the basis of race” simpliciter, since the range of 
possibility is not coextensive in these instances, and the latter more capably represents a 
general sanction.  The direct application of utilitarian calculus Lyons imagines is 
analogous to this example of racial discrimination, in that IU shows that the direct 
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application of the principle of utility to acts or rules is a violation of its restriction to 
third-order application only, since either alternate form is extensionally equivalent with a 
form of utilitarianism that cannot account for rights.  As such, it does involve a 
conceptual error, since the scope of the principle is not coextensive in the two cases.   
 After all Lyons does to substantiate the claim that IU can accommodate 
substantive rights, the brief discussion he dedicates to the judgment that it cannot in fact 
do so represents a decidedly thin treatment.  Lyons abandons his theory prematurely, with 
scant argument.  For moral errors can lead to conceptual mistakes.  The failure to 
recognize the legitimacy of individual sanctity is exactly the error act utilitarians make.  
Yet individual sanctity can be spelled out in IU terms.  Since individual sanctity is a 
universal concern, it is a legitimate aim for impartial IU.  As such, it counts as a 
legitimate, utility-defined general limit to utility maximization in individual 
circumstances.   
 Nonetheless, some philosophers find the appeal to principles other than direct 
utility calculation suspect in a utilitarian theory, such as IU.  Will Kymlicka argues that 
IU is ad hoc:   
The utilitarian says that the reason why we use non-utilitarian procedures is that 
they happen to maximize utility.  But isn't it more plausible to say that the reason 
why we use non-utilitarian procedures is simply that we accept a non-utilitarian 
standard of rightness?  Why think there has to be some indirect utilitarian 
explanation for our non-utilitarian commitments?14   
 
Perhaps, Kymlicka argues, grounding of rights is better served by an alternate theory, one 
that does not appeal to general utility.  Once we account for rights as limits on utility 
maximization, he reasons, why not simply discard the principle of utility?    
 This objection misconstrues the derivation of the principle of liberty as found in 
Lyons' interpretation of Mill.  Based as it is upon the harm principle, as Lyons argues, the 
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derivation of the principle of liberty refers ultimately back to human well-being.  After 
all, how can liberty have any value for humans, if not by ultimate reference to their well-
being?  To say that liberty is intrinsically valuable appears to set the principle adrift, 
without reference to its importance for humans.   
 Even if a defender of IU were to concede that some arguments for principles of 
justice owe their traction to origination in alternate normative theories, this does not 
doom IU to dismissal as ad hoc.  Allan Gibbard approaches the question in this way:   
What place does a non-utilitarian rationale have in utilitarian argument?  Just 
this: People in general, utilitarians and non-utilitarians, can be strongly moved by 
a principle with a coherent rationale, and especially one that seems to fill in the 
dictum “to each his own.”  They claim that when we look at the [non-utilitarian] 
principles that have such strong appeal and test them carefully against our more 
specific moral convictions, we find no coherent whole [that those principles 
compose].15   
 
That is, coherence is a standard with considerable appeal for agents, and IU can supply 
this coherent whole.  Gibbard explains how this might work:   
A principle with a rationale that carries conviction may be of great utility.  
Suppose two alternative principles both have a high acceptance-utility: for each, 
its being adopted and followed by most people would have high utility.  If one 
has much more natural appeal as a principle than does the other, there will be 
greater utility in supporting it even if it has slightly less acceptance utility.  It will 
not only be more convincing to others; it will command the utilitarian's own 
principled adherence more securely.16   
 
The deliberation Gibbard suggests can operate exclusively at the critical level of IU.  
Such an approach appears sufficient to overcome the kind of objection advanced by 
Kymlicka, since Gibbard's argument shows that principles of justice that originate in 
alternate normative theories can be justified by IU, via the fact that, as Gibbard says “[a] 




Indirect Utilitarianism and Rights   
 Several authors have taken up the question whether consequentialism can ground 
rights claims.  I will address a sample of such arguments, in order to support my main 
goal – to show that IU can be used to support substantive rights.  Philip Pettit argues17 
that rights can be recognized by the consequentialist, because the recognition of rights 
serves as the best way to promote a particular sort of highly desirable consequence, 
namely dignity:   
[A] person retains dignity in his treatment by another only if he preserves a 
certain dominion over how he fares at the other's hands: only if that other agent is 
not free to do to him whatever he wills, or even whatever some beneficial plan 
requires.18   
 
Pettit reasons that if the consequentialist is serious about dominion as a requisite of 
dignity, she must appropriately constrain consequentialist calculation.  These constraints 
are the very rights sought by those such as myself, who aim to ground rights claims in a 
consequentialist theory, such as IU.   
 John Gray argues that we may characterize IU as a rights-based political theory 
grounded in a goal-based moral theory.  In this he echoes Lyons' formulation of IU as 
prohibiting the direct application of utilitarian calculation to act evaluation:   
First, and most fundamentally, the principle of utility figures here not as a 
prescriptive principle, but as a general standard of evaluation.  Indirect 
utilitarianism may be defined as that species of utilitarian theory in which a 
strong distinction is marked between the critical and practical levels of moral 
thought, and in which the principle of utility is invoked, solely or primarily, at 
the critical level.19   
 
Since IU treats rights as second-order utility, Gray argues, the conceptual machinery is 
supplied to prevent IU's collapse into act utilitarianism.  Further, he argues that since Mill 
treats autonomy and security as elevated over other human interests by appeal to the harm 
principle, we ought to look to these two vital interests rather than what utility results for 
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the agents in question, in deliberation on the limit to the agents' liberty.  He notes that 
these two vital interests function in Mill much as do Rawls' primary goods.   
 As Thomas Nagel concedes, "there are evils great enough so that one would be 
justified in murdering or torturing an innocent person to prevent them."20 Consequences – 
when bad enough – appear to justify the qualification of individual rights.  That is, Nagel 
argues that considered judgment about rights shows them to not be absolute.  If the 
preventable death of one person will (somehow) preclude the deaths of a thousand (pick 
your number) others, considered judgment seems to fall on the side of preventing the 
thousand deaths.  Status-based accounts thus seem to need to appeal to some account of 
consequences, to describe how such qualifications operate.  I believe that instrumental 
accounts can provide for the assigning of great importance to rights, without exposing an 
account of rights to the criticism that absolutist accounts of rights suffer, by never 
granting exceptions.   
 Such circumstances as Nagel evokes are accounted for by Mill, when he says that 
direct reference to utility is only prompted in the conflict among values.  Such prompting 
occurs with marginal cases such as the time-bomb planter who must be tortured in order 
to save an overwhelming number of lives.  The erroneous (from Mill's perspective, on 
Lyons' reading) divergence into act utilitarianism occurs when states exploit such a 
principle for prudential purposes.   
 
IU and Sen’s Inclusive Consequentialism   
 A possible alternative to IU is defended by Amartya Sen,1 who criticizes broadly-
construed utilitarianism for neglecting morally relevant consequences of action.  He 
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locates this problem in utilitarianism's constraining of evaluation only to utilities, which 
results from its dedication to welfarism.  His alternative, Inclusive Consequentialism 
(“IC”), while also consequentialist, makes no such commitment to narrowing evaluation 
to utilities – hence “inclusive.”  Sen explains that his notion of consequentialism 
resembles the account offered by Philip Pettit, whom he quotes as defining the term 
thusly:  “Roughly speaking, consequentialism is the theory that the way to tell whether a 
particular choice is the right choice for an agent to have made is to look at the relevant 
consequences of the decision; to look at the relevant effects of the decision on the 
world.”2  Here we find no reference to any standard of measurement, which Sen argues is 
a virtue of this approach.   
 In elaborating his account of IC beyond the account furnished by Pettit, Sen 
discusses the following three features: situated evaluation; maximizing framework; and 
nonexclusion of state components.  By situated evaluation, Sen refers to the question of 
which perspective is the appropriate one from which the evaluation is to be made.  If 
consequentialism requires taking responsibility for the results of one's actions, then the 
particular individual making the choice must be aware of his own position in relation to 
his actions and their consequences.   
 Sen imparts an excellent and vivid illustration of situated evaluation, by way of a 
dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna (the invincible archer) from the Mahabharata, as 
they are on the brink of the battle at Kurukshetra.  Krishna rebuts Arjuna's misgivings 
about the probability that Arjuna will kill many of his family and friends in the coming 
battle, by arguing (in deontological fashion, Sen notes) that since they both agree that 
their cause is just, Arjuna must fight irrespective of the consequences.  Sen takes Arjuna's 
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side in the debate, reasoning that the abstraction inherent in Krishna's logic (that because 
one (in this case, Arjuna) is in the situation he is in, one's (Arjuna's) duty follows 
irrespective of consequences) neglects an important and morally relevant feature of the 
situation – namely, that it is not merely “one” who is so situated, but Arjuna, who bears 
particular relations to those he would kill, and must bear the additional consequence that 
it is Arjuna himself who must bear the situated consequences of his actions.   
 By maximizing framework, Sen refers to the fact that since consequentialism aims 
at some goal, then, from among a number of options, the one that best accomplishes the 
specified goal is the one rightly chosen.  Sen notes that this feature of consequentialism 
has been criticized as involving an unfulfillable requirement – that all possible outcomes 
must be known, in order to be ranked in relation to one another.  He rebuts this criticism 
by arguing that while optimization requires this, maximization does not, nor does it even 
require an identifiably best alternative.  Maximization, he argues, only requires that one 
not choose an alternative that is worse than another that can be chosen.  Again, Sen offers 
a fruitful analogy in explaining this feature, by reference to the parable of Buridan's ass, 
which could not distinguish between two haystacks.  As an optimizer, the poor animal 
could not choose, and starved to death.  By this he aims to show not only that the 
distinction between maximization (the lesser standard) and optimization (the higher 
standard) is a significant one, but that IC is not exposed to the criticism that it involves an 
unfulfillable requirement.   
 For an illustration of nonexclusion of state components, Sen turns back to the 
significance of Arjuna's misgivings – namely, the difference between killing people in 
general, and killing his friends in particular.  Sen argues that IC is superior to 
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utilitarianism, in that utilitarianism involves an arbitrary a priori exclusion of nonutility 
components of the state of affairs resulting from an act, while IC does not.  In Arjuna's 
case, Sen argues, he cannot treat others’ killing of people and his own killing of people in 
the same way.  That is, agent-specific state components involve demands that non-agent-
specific state components do not.  As a result, Sen argues, the fact that IC can distinguish 
between agent-specific state components and non-agent-specific state components, while 
utilitarianism cannot, makes IC the superior account.   
 I have no quarrel with the constructive elements of Sen's argument.  It is my aim, 
in this dissertation, to show how a model that many dismiss as a viable ground for rights 
claims can be so viable.  As for Sen's critiques of utilitarianism, I do not aim, in this 
dissertation, to defend utilitarianism broadly – I aim instead to show how IU can 
withstand criticisms that show how other forms of utilitarianism are not a viable ground 
for rights claims.  However, Sen's arguments against utilitarianism warrant response.  I 
will now address Sen's criticisms of utilitarianism, in order to demonstrate how IU can 
withstand such criticisms.   
 Sen's ideas of situated evaluation and nonexclusion of state components both pose 
a challenge to utilitarianism, given that, in restricting evaluation to welfare, it neglects 
morally important aspects of outcomes.  Thus as a form of utilitarianism, IU might be 
expected to suffer the same shortcoming.  There appear to be two ways to answer such a 
charge.  One is that, in the case of Arjuna, his situation with respect to his friends and 
family might be seen as a prudential issue, rather than a moral one, inasmuch as killing 
his friend differs from killing a stranger.  This, it can be argued, is due to the fact that (as 
Sen argues3) impartiality seems to be an important condition among normative systems.  
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Thus the difference between Arjuna's killing a stranger or a friend is morally 
insignificant, and as such cannot constitute the basis for a criticism of utilitarianism.  The 
fact that Arjuna insists that there is a difference does not eo ipso imply that there is a 
moral difference – it may be merely a psychological one, for him.   
 Perhaps, however, this response to Sen's criticism is too narrow.  The second way 
to answer the charge of arbitrary exclusion is to argue that Sen underestimates 
utilitarianism's ability to account for the apparently excluded factors.  It is unclear why 
restricting consequentialist evaluation to utility neglects the features Sen specifies, rather 
than providing a medium into which such features can be translated.  For instance, Sen 
also discusses the example of a parent's choosing food for her baby:     
Consider, for example, the parent of a child for whom she is choosing a particular 
baby food. The requirement of situated evaluation does not, in any way, vindicate 
smugness about one's contingent level of ignorance, and does not deny the need 
for the person to find out, if reasonably possible, more about what others know or 
see (for example, that the baby food with which the parent is familiar might have 
been shown to be harmful). Nor does it deny the relevance of broader sympathies 
(for example, a parent may well ask whether it is right that her child should have 
the benefit of some baby food to which other children do not have access). What 
is denied is the possibility of ignoring the person's own responsibilities in her 
particular situation, in this case that of being a parent of this child.21 
 
In this case, there are no names – any parent bears a particular relationship to their child 
that cannot be captured by a formulation of Rxy, where x and y are generic individual 
humans.  Any person deciding whether to kill a friend faces Arjuna's situation.  There is 
only something special about Arjuna's friends for Arjuna because they are his friends.  
Absent further argument about why this situation is not generalizable, there is no reason 
to believe that this state component cannot be translated into utilitarian terms.  If so much 
is granted, then (dis)utility can be assigned to any situation in which a parent neglects 
their child, and the state components Sen discusses can be accounted for by IU.   
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Human Rights   
 While the body of philosophical literature on human rights is extensive, there is 
general consensus on the necessary and sufficient conditions of this kind of rights.  These 
include such attributes as universality and the protection of important human interests, as 
grounded in the notion of a minimally decent human life, which includes the securing of 
individual dignity.   
 I suggest that the way in which IU might contribute to the task of securing human 
rights is as follows.  With general consensus that some conception of a minimally decent 
human life will be viable, a case can, in principle, be made for the existence of such 
rights.  With appeal to general utility operating solely at the critical level of analysis, the 
standards for human rights can be general enough to apply universally, but also to allow 
for cultural variation in their implementation, such that universal assent to their 
legitimacy might be achieved.  If so much is granted, then a case can be made, in 
principle, for IU-based human rights.  I take up this argument in Chapter 4.  And if 
democracy can be shown to be necessary for the protection of important interests, the 
way is open for a case that supports democracy as a human right that is IU-based.  I take 
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 In this chapter, I aim to show how indirect utilitarianism supports human rights, 
first by defining the term ‘human rights’ by reference to the work of James Nickel, then 
by showing how IU can furnish a justification for human rights that meet Nickel’s 
criteria.  The way in which I use Nickel’s theory in my overall argument is as offering a 
defensible definition of rights, as well as an account of how we come to that definition – 
all justificatory work is done by IU.  However, there are certain aspects of Nickel’s 
theory that, I contend, serve as important points of connection with the machinery of IU.  
I will indicate these places as compatible, commensurate, etc., but these observations 
about compatibility do not eo ipso provide justificatory machinery.  I intend to 
demonstrate how this account improves on Nickel’s theory, by providing it with a more 
thoroughgoing normative foundation.  I then address the main question – whether 
democracy is a human right – and build upon the arguments from the previous chapters to 
prepare my case for an IU-based human right to democratic governance, which concludes 
in Chapter Five.  I then present Joshua Cohen’s case for a negative reply to the main 
question—that making a human right of the right to democratic governance strips the 
latter of its demanding substance—and respond to Cohen’s argument.  Doing so requires 
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that I address the work of John Rawls, which I do in part by appealing to the work of 
Akeel Bilgrami.  Rawls argues that there is a limit to what degree of agreement we can 
reasonably expect from global public reasoning, while Bilgrami’s appeal to internal 
reasoning, in my view, blunts the force of the limits Rawls describes.   
 
Elements of Human Rights   
 In Making Sense of Human Rights, James Nickel begins explaining how human 
rights are a subset of general rights, first by addressing the conceptual issues involved.  
He begins by enumerating four elements of rights, their fundamental constituents.   These 
are: their conditions of possession; their scope; the addressees of the right; and the weight 
of the right.  The conditions of possession identify the party by whom the right is held.  
This, Nickel explains, can be as narrow as a single individual (as in the case of a will) or 
as broad as all humanity.  Whether a right is forfeitable or otherwise subject to revocation 
will be spelled out under that right’s conditions of possession.   
 The scope of a right specifies that to which the right-holder is entitled.  For 
instance, the right to bodily integrity precludes the kind of punishment for crime as the 
taking of extremities for theft.  The scope of a right also includes conditions of 
operability – that is, specification of when a right comes into play, and what sorts of 
actions or events evoke the right in question.   
 The specified addressees of the right are those identified as incurring some 
obligation correlative to the right in question.    Here, Nickel argues, the addressees may 
either be a particular set of individuals (by which I take him to mean that a perfect duty is 
incurred) or humanity at large (which I read as meaning that an imperfect duty is 
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incurred).  So, if there is a right to bodily integrity that precludes the kind of punishment 
for crime as the taking of extremities for theft, then none may mete out such punishment.   
 The fourth element Nickel enumerates – the weight of a right – specifies whether 
a right can be overridden, and how.  Weight is a measure of ranking among a more 
general set of norms, and is evoked when norms conflict with one another.  To say a right 
is 'prima facie', Nickel argues, is not to say that it is a right in appearance only, but rather 
that its weight is unspecified.  This will usually mean, he says, that in conflict with other 
norms, weightier norms can override prima facie rights.  Given that rights can vary 
greatly in their specificity, Nickel argues that the abstractness of rights is not always to be 
diminished, as this very abstractness can be a feature of a right, rather than a detriment to 
its significance.  For example, “equal protection under the law” is a very abstract right, 
but one understood to be extremely important.   
 
Functions and Types of Human Rights  
 After enumerating the elements of rights he supports, Nickel addresses the various 
functions of rights.  He begins this discussion by comparing rights to high-priority goals.  
Nickel argues that rights are properly distinguished from high-priority goals in virtue of 
two additional attributes: definiteness and bindingness.  That is, in addition to high 
priority, rights have further, more stringent standards.  By ‘definiteness’, Nickel means 
that rights specify both the right-holder(s) and the addressee(s).  That is, particular 
individuals will be specified as right-holders, while other particular individuals will be 
specified as addressees (except in the case of an imperfect duty, which may be read as 
specifying  “anyone capable of violation of the right in question” as addressees).  By 
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‘bindingness’, Nickel means that the conferral of a right bestows a mandatory obligation 
on the addressee(s).  This is done to point out that a right is not merely a possession of the 
right-holder; it also limits the liberty of the addressee(s).   
 Having identified the elements and functions exhibited by a plausible account of 
rights, Nickel follows Wesley Hohfeld in categorizing types of rights.  Hohfeld classifies 
rights in four ways:  liberty rights involve the obligation not to prevent A from x (e.g. 
not to prevent one’s freedom of assembly); claim rights involve the obligation to make x 
available to A (e.g., the mechanics by which one’s vote counts in an election); power 
rights confer competence on A to x, and involve an obligation to be liable to the 
particular power x (e.g., the ability to loan my property to others); immunity rights confer 
immunity from x to A, with a correlative disability by B to x with respect to A (e.g., 
immunity from any religion’s strictures).  His purpose in rehearsing the Hohfeldian 
schema is to demonstrate the wide variety of normative standings that rights protect and 
confer, as a matter of their particular functions.  Equipped with accounts of the nature and 
types of rights, Nickel proceeds to the issue of their justification.   
 
Justifying Human Rights  
 Nickel then addresses the issue of justifying rights.  He addresses three positions 
on justificatory standards for qualifying as a right: entitlement theory; entitlement-plus 
theory; and legally-implemented entitlement theory.  The difference among these three 
will be in the threshold that must be met in order for a claim to qualify as a right.  Under 
entitlement theory, rights are very strong moral reasons why the holder ought to have 
certain freedoms, benefits, and so on.  According to this theory, which Nickel attributes 
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to H. J. McCloskey,1 the right in question is identified as a claim by the right-holder, but 
these claims are not claims against others, and as such need not specify obligation-
holders.  Nickel credits this theory with two main advantages.  First, this formulation has 
the advantage of capturing the kind of rights talk people engage in, even when it is not 
clear who the burden-bearers are.  The second advantage Nickel identifies with this 
theory is that it does not specify particular social milieus, and as such the rights at issue 
are readily exportable among diverse cultures.   
 The main disadvantage Nickel identifies with entitlement theory is that under this 
theory, a moral right will exist whenever there is a particularly desirable good, a result 
that leads to the possibility that demand outruns supply.  That is, given its lack of 
definiteness, entitlement theory is unable to distinguish between rights and mere high-
priority goals.  As such, Nickel deems entitlement theory as insufficient to the task of 
justifying rights.   
 The second justificatory theory Nickel addresses is entitlement-plus theory, which 
he attributes to Joel Feinberg.2  This theory distinguishes between claims to benefits and 
claims against those who furnish those benefits.  Thus, the “plus” of entitlement-plus 
theory is the very specification of obligation-holders lacking in entitlement theory.  
However, Nickel notes that Feinberg also allows for “manifesto” rights, thereby leaving 
room for rights that do not specify obligation-holders in perfect fashion.  After analysis of 
all three justificatory theories of rights, Nickel supports entitlement-plus theory.   
 The third theory Nickel addresses is legally-implemented entitlement theory, by 
which rights are established only through codification in law.  The argument for this 
position – which Nickel attributes to Jeremy Bentham – is that entitlement-plus theory 
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justifies rights that are insufficiently precise to serve as full-fledged rights.  To this, 
Nickel replies by reference to the utility of the term “vehicle,” which – despite its 
vagueness – does not seems to cause us any trouble, even though the term covers 
everything from skateboards to space shuttles.  Additionally, he reasons, without 
discussion of moral rights simpliciter, there appears to be no way to evaluate laws, many 
of which have been revoked due to their inherent injustice.  He thus determines legally-
implemented entitlement theory to set too high a justificatory standard for rights claims.    
   
Making Sense of Human Rights    
 In order for human rights to be more than mere wishes or aspirations, Nickel 
argues, more than a thorough understanding of the general nature of rights is required.  
Human rights need to be construed within a system of morality.  Nickel notes that this 
must occur only within justified moralities, not all moralities.  This, he says, requires 
some commitment to an objectivity of moral norms – at minimum, it requires that some 
moral norms are more defensible than others.   
 Nickel defends the view that full-fledged rights are of the entitlement-plus 
justificatory model.  For a right to count as entitlement-plus, two things must obtain: first, 
there must be a justifiable entitlement to some freedom or benefit, which involves a 
strong moral case for making it available to all; and second, the defender of the right in 
question must be able to justify duties and other burdens.  Nickel elaborates on the place 
of these reasons thusly:   
To assert the existence of a justified moral right, in this view, will be to 
specify an entitlement with holders, scope, weight and addressees and to 
assert that it is possible to defend this entitlement and its associated 
burdens with good moral reasons.  At the level of moral theory, the 
identification of these elements may be fairly abstract, with many details 
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left unspecified.  Nonetheless, at least a vague conception of the content of 
these elements must be present for one to have a full-fledged right.3 
 
By “justifiable,” Nickel explains that the case for a justified moral right (such as a human 
right) must make reference not to accepted or practiced moralities, but rather those that 
are justifiable, by reference to the theory's preferability in comparison with others.  In this 
chapter I will present indirect utilitarianism as a viable candidate for this role.   
 
Starting Points for Justifying Rights  
 Nickel observes that justifications of human rights must originate somewhere – 
that the chain of reasons must bottom out in basic premises.  Although Nickel 
acknowledges a number of starting points for justifying human rights, he argues that 
basic premises “construe good reasons as those that appeal to the prudence of a rational 
agent over the long term.”4  He distinguishes between two basic interests: leading a life, 
as opposed to having a life.  Having a life includes avoiding premature death or 
incarceration caused by the invasions of others, as well as having access to assistance 
from others in obtaining necessities.  Leading a life means being able to make and carry 
out key decisions about the kind of life one will live and avoid being treated merely as a 
resource.  While these two basic reasons can be construed as wholly prudential, Nickel 
argues that they can serve as important interests – as facts about people that can indicate 
what kinds of protections are required from the right in question, and thereby guide the 
necessary moral reasoning that leads to the viability of the right.   
 Nickel argues that any system of morality ought to have the following three 
features:   
1 a secure moral claim to life, liberty, and other conditions of a minimally decent 
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human life;  
2 these claims should generate duties to respond, either directly or through 
institutions;  
3 in conflicts between claims, inequalities should be minimized.5    
 
Nickel notes that although he refers to these features as “claims,” he does not treat them 
merely as entitlements, without any correlative duties.  At a minimum, he says the duties 
generated will be abstract, in that they generate a general obligation by all relevant agents 
to organize institutions and social and political arrangements such that they do not 
undermine fundamental interests.  He also notes that they represent minimal standards – 
he makes no claim that these are the only principles of justice, and explains that, as he 
conceives theories of human rights, they do not represent complete moral and political 
theories.   
 Nickel also explains how rights can be derived from other rights.  He 
demonstrates three ways R2 can follow from R1:   
1. R1 may be a general or abstract right that implies some more specific 
right; that is, the scope of R1 includes the scope of R2.  For example, the 
right to freedom of expression entails the right to distribute pamphlets.   
 
2.  R2 may serve to make violations of R1 less likely, even though the 
rights operate in different spheres.  For example, freedom of the press 
involves exposing misconduct by officials, which in turn can protect 
citizens from violations of due process, for instance in criminal trials.   
 
3.  The effective implementation of R1 may require the implementation 
of R2, even though R2 is not normally thought to be included in the 
scope of R1.  For example, a woman has a right to unimpeded access to 
birth control for the prevention of ovarian cysts.   
 
The relationship of implication between R1 and R2 in any of these cases, Nickel argues, 
can be of varying strengths, along a continuum between essential and merely helpful.  He 
compares this approach with that of Henry Shue, who argues that “security, subsistence, 
and liberty are basic, so if there are any rights, there will be these three.”6  Nickel argues 
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that Shue's sine qua non formulation is too strong, and ought to be replaced by “strongly 
supportive of,” since examples can be given of the right to, say, asylum without a right to 
physical security.  That is, “supportive of” can function where “necessary for” was meant 
to, without overstatement.   
 Again, the account offered here of Nickel’s theory is not used, in my overall 
argument, as supplying any justificatory machinery – that is supplied by IU.  The reason I 
appeal to Nickel is that his theory presents what I take to be a defensible account of 
rights, that I contend can serve (and in the overall argument does serve) as an account of 
how IU can be honed to address the particular question of a human right to democracy.  
That is, because of the virtues of the entitlement-plus theory of rights Nickel defends 
against the alternatives, I argue that an Indirect Utilitarian would adopt a set of rules that 
defines human rights in this way.  Adopting a set of rules that defines human rights in 
either of the alternative ways involves costs that outweigh benefits.  Limiting the 
definition of rights to legally-implemented rights theory seems inadequate, since some 
wrongs are unaddressed by law, yet seem to involve harm to important human interests.  
Without recourse to a way to address such harms, we seem to incur costs that outweigh 
the benefits.  On the other hand, defining rights as mere entitlements seems to rob the 
notion of human rights of their force.  If the Indirect Utilitarian reasons that the cost of 
failing to effectively protect important human interests outweighs the benefits of doing 
so, then defining rights by entitlement theory is passed over in favor of adopting a set of 
rules that defines rights according to entitlement-plus theory.  Thus does the Indirect 
Utilitarian reason, in choosing entitlement-plus as a theory of human rights.   
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Justifying Specific Goals 
 Nickel then addresses the question of how one can make the transition from 
abstract claims pertaining to life, liberty, or fairness to specific rights requiring political 
implementation.  It is possible to do so, he argues, by looking to abstract principles that 
guide and limit what specific rights permit and require, and by looking also to 
information regarding contemporary societies that identifies the threats, and the 
institutions and norms to be used in response to those threats.   
 Treating the leading of a life as a basic interest, Nickel notes that while the terms 
“fundamental interest” and “secure claim to life” denote the need for protection of 
something of great importance, he argues that we must still find a way to make arguments 
for particular human rights from these abstract concepts.  Here he refers to the work of 
Ronald Dworkin,7 who argues that the way forward is to elaborate conceptions of the 
abstract concept in question:   
A conception of a concept proposes some general principles that explain why the 
concept applies in some cases where it clearly does and in those where it clearly 
does not.  To show, for example, that basic freedom is at stake in a particular case 
considered borderline, elaborate a conception of what is involved in leading a life, 
or what aspects of human personality are most central.  The next step is to use this 
conception to generate a result for the issue in question.8   
 
From among competing conceptions of abstract moral or political principles, Nickel 
reasons, making a case for a particular one can involve appeal to their congruence with 
other well-established principles.  As an example, he argues that the right against racial 
discrimination proceeds as follows.  The assigning of unequal burdens on the basis of 
race can have no rational justification.  This inability to justify, coupled with the harm 
caused by discriminatory systems, furnishes the basis for the claim that racial 
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discrimination violates the principle of fairness.  Thus protections against racial 
discrimination pass the test of importance.   
 However, Nickel argues, satisfaction of the importance test is insufficient to 
justify a particular right.  It must also be demonstrated that the right in question protects 
an important interest against some significant, enduring threat.  The threat identified as 
necessitating the right in question must be substantial and recurrent, and must – if it is to 
justify, in part, the right in question – be demonstrated to be insufficiently addressed by 
weaker norms.  It must also be demonstrated that the right in question is feasible.   
 In addition to threats to fundamental human interests from individuals or groups 
(such as discrimination, exploitation, negligence, harm, or murder), threats can also come 
from government.   State-oriented threats can involve the foregoing, Nickel argues, in 
addition to the following:  
1 using the criminal law system to suppress opposition and destroy the enemies of those 
in power; 
2 victimizing unpopular minorities (or even majorities);  
3 corruption, favoritism, and ineptitude; 
4 using imprisonment, torture, and murder to consolidate political power; and 
5 using political power to extend and entrench the favorable position of a dominant 
group.9 
 
Nickel also argues that omission of protection counts as a threat.  He acknowledges that 
while it can be difficult to determine what counts as an omission, he argues that 
identification of a duty to act in a particular case is sufficient to demonstrate an omission.  
So if people have a moral claim to government aid when such aid is required in the 
protection and provision of fundamental human interests, then the failure to provide aid 
to, say, victims of natural disasters (for example, residents of New Orleans during and 
after Hurricane Katrina in 2005) counts as an omission and thus constitutes a state-
oriented threat.  Nickel explains that the threat requirements are intended to be a low 
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standard – that the main function of the discussion of threats is to identify those recurrent 
threats that involve important interests, such that putative rights have a chance at full-
fledged justification.   
 
Indirect Utilitarianism and Human Rights   
 I aim now to demonstrate how IU can furnish human rights that meet Nickel’s 
criteria.  Having done so, I intend to then demonstrate how this account improves on 
Nickel’s theory.  I do so not merely to show congruity of the theories, but aim moreover 
to demonstrate how IU, as a viable interpretation of the work of John Stuart Mill 
executed by David Lyons, might be elaborated further, such that it demonstrates the 
viability of a human right to democracy.  That is, I am to show how it is possible to read 
the work of Lyons, Nelson, and Nickel (among others) as positions a Millian might take 
when devoting her efforts to the question of a human right to democracy.   
In Chapter 3, I discussed how IU applies direct utilitarian reasoning only at the 
critical level, and regulates conduct itself only indirectly.  Under IU, the question of 
whether a set of rules ought to be adopted is a matter of weighing costs and benefits.  In 
principle, a right can be established, granted that the absence of a given right is more 
costly than its general acceptance.   
This, in brief, is my IU-based case for a human right to democracy: that in 
principle, since democracy is the political system that is the most open – in terms of 
access, publicity, and with legislation subject to reversal – the benefits of maintaining 
such a system of governance outweigh the costs of doing so.  Nelson argues that 
democracy is justified because it yields the most moral results, in accordance with his 
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minimal system of morality in Chapter 2.  While I believe this is so, the connection 
between open government and the most moral results in Nelson’s argument is altered, 
when situated in my IU-based argument for democracy as a human right.  Recall from 
Chapter 2 that, by “open,” Nelson means that administrators and legislators are forced to 
defend their actions publicly, and that in meeting this condition, he reasons that 
administrators and legislators must formulate principles with justifications that are both 
coherent and likely to be capable of gaining widespread acceptance.  The costs of having 
these features, it seems to me, do not appear exorbitant and outweigh the formulation of 
principles with justifications that are both incoherent and incapable of gaining 
widespread acceptance.  If so much is true, then an Indirect Utilitarian would adopt the 
former, rather than the latter, as a set of rules.  That is, I treat Nelson's definition of 
democracy (not his justification) as a set of rules that, because of its demonstrated 
theoretical superiority over alternate definitions of democracy, would be adopted by an 
Indirect Utilitarian.  It is important to say here that I do not propose IU as a way of 
accounting for the moral values at stake that is superior to alternate normative theories, 
but that it can do so, despite common criticism that consequentialist theories cannot 
furnish substantive rights.  Stating the argument purely in terms of the moral values at 
stake might give some guidance in terms of the relative weight of those values, but with 
IU these values are represented in such a way that offers a more robust accounting of the 
values under discussion, such that further refinement and clarification of those values can 
be undertaken.  I turn now to a recapitulation of the arguments made by Nickel, followed 
at each stage by my grounding of his arguments' claims in IU.   
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 Nickel argues that one starting point for justifying a right is appeal to the basic 
human interest of leading a life.  Since leading a life means being able to make and carry 
out key decisions about the kind of life one will live and avoid being treated merely as a 
resource, the fact of the state's coercive power over individuals prompts the correlative 
question of legitimacy of authority.  If democracy is a political system that tends to yield 
the most moral results, then the government’s coercive acts will tend to be more moral.  
Having access to such a system, it seems to me, would count as necessary for being able 
to make and carry out key decisions about the kind of life one will live and avoid being 
treated merely as a resource.  So if a case can be made in principle that the benefits of 
maintaining rights to those liberties necessary for leading a life outweigh the costs, and 
that democracy is the most effective way to support such rights, then IU furnishes us with 
the justification for a human right to democracy.    
 Recall from above that Nickel argues that any system of morality ought to have 
the following three features: a secure moral claim to life, liberty, and other conditions of 
a minimally decent human life; these claims should generate duties to respond, either 
directly or through institutions; and that in conflicts between claims, inequalities should 
be minimized.  I contend that as with the in-principle case for leading a life, IU can 
furnish Nickel's requirements of a moral system that he uses to justify democracy.  Under 
IU, it can be plausibly argued that he costs of failure to generally maintain conditions of 
minimally decent human life in a society outweigh the benefits, since social cohesion 
depends to an extensive degree on individuals generally living a life that meets the 
standard of minimal decency.  This takes us as far as the minimal requirements of 
Nickel’s theory – to show how IU justifies the move from minimal decency to 
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democracy, further argumentation is required, and I take this up in Chapter 5.  Again, I do 
not argue that Nickel’s minimal conditions are met by IU in a way superior to that of 
rival normative systems; only that it is able to do so, as a component of my more general 
argument that IU furnishes the machinery by which a consequentialist argument can offer 
a viable account of rights, more generally, and the human right to democracy, more 
specifically.   
 In addition to being compatible with Nickel's minimal requirements, I contend 
that IU, as a more thoroughgoing normative theory, constitutes an improvement over 
Nickel's more generic minimal normative system.  This is because, in the case of a more 
thoroughgoing system, chances are greater that more definitive moral guidance will be 
offered, such that the determination of (morally) right action might more reliably guide 
behavior.  Nickel argues that human rights need to be construed within a system of 
morality – but only within justified moralities, not all moralities.  I contend that IU is a 
justified morality, and as such can serve as the normative grounding for Nickel’s theory 
of human rights.  While Nickel claims that his approach to justifying human rights 
operates within any justified morality, he does not show this.  I present an argument that 
his approach does operate within one moral theory—IU.   
 
Rawls and the Human Right to Democracy  
 John Rawls argues10 that decent hierarchical peoples should be included in the 
society of peoples, despite their nondemocratic forms of government. Rawls thus 
implicitly criticizes the position that political rights are human rights as intolerant – 
thereby setting the terms of the debate, by which human rights are properly considered as 
! 79!
minimal standards that do not accommodate claims to democratic governance. Joshua 
Cohen appears to accord with Rawls on this point, arguing that although a theocratic 
society (for instance) may be for that reason unjust, it does not for that reason alone seem 
to violate human rights.   
 The reason Rawls gives for the position that decent hierarchical peoples are rightly 
recognized as well-ordered is that there is, he contends, a limit to what degree of 
agreement we can reasonably expect from global public reasoning, and agreement upon 
the universalization of a right to democracy lies beyond these limits.11  I thus count Rawls 
as an opponent of my own position.  It is on this point about what we can reasonably 
expect from global public reasoning that I differ with Rawls.  In order to make this point, 
I turn – after a few introductory remarks – to the work of Akeel Bilgrami.   
 Granted that moral disagreements among cultures are often based upon such 
apparently unresolvable disputes as which religion is “true,” these disagreements can 
appear insurmountable.  Take as an example the tension between democracy and Islam.  
Government by the will of the people is anathema to many interpreters of the Qur’an,12 
because for them it is submission to the will of Allah that rightly guides human activity, 
not people.  Liberalism, on the other hand, is centered upon the ideals of individual 
liberty and equality, and theocratic rule violates the norms that promote these ideals. The 
source of this dispute thus may seem intractable by appeal to reason.  Is it?   
 As do Amartya Sen13 and Alistair Macleod14 (among others), Akeel Bilgrami15 
argues that moral stances are supported by particular reasons, and these are evaluable in 
relation to the reasons for holding a stance contrary to one’s own.  Such evaluation 
contributes to the process of moral development – altering one’s value system in some 
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way.  Bilgrami reasons that since there is no value- free way to establish the superiority 
of one system of values over another, the case must be made through fair and open 
deliberation.  The method of persuasion Bilgrami recommends involves rectifying value 
tensions (most of which, he notes, are more subtle than outright contradictions) arising 
within an individual’s system of moral values, by providing compelling reasons to one’s 
interlocutor in the attempt to sway him to alter his evaluative stance.  For instance, 
Iranians may decide that the way in which Allah guides human activity is via the will of 
the people, thereby resolving the tension between the Muslim values of submitting to 
Allah and of resisting oppression by other humans (presuming democracy is a good way 
to hedge against oppression).   
 A crucial aspect of Bilgrami’s argument is its appeal to historical perspective as a 
context in which conflicts internal to one’s value system can arise, by “introducing 
tensions and dissonance in the relations between their value commitments.”16  Back to the 
Iranian example: while street violence there has subsided, the argument between 
supporters and opponents of the Ayatollah’s endorsement of the 2009 Iranian presidential 
election results continues to rupture the working relationship among top Iranian 
government officials (who once were closely-allied victorious revolutionaries), and at 
least part of this argument concerns the tension between theocracy and democracy.17  I 
would buttress Bilgrami’s point about history by claiming that rights and justice are 
properly understood as moral responses to wrongs, not as constituents of an ahistorical, 
abstract social blueprint.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as a response to the atrocities of World 
War II.  The reasons supporting particular laws can be illuminated in part by revealing 
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the historical wrong they are adopted to address.  This part played by history, in turn, 
reinforces the point that, over time, participants in public reasoning are able to learn from 
the consequences of various points of view, such that the certainty with which 
convictions are held might be softened, or reimagined, in such a way that the expressions 
of value take a form that is less likely to result in conflict with other societies.  If so much 
is granted, there is less reason to hew to the narrower expectations about global public 
reasoning held by liberals such as Rawls and Cohen.   
 
Cohen’s Democratic Theory    
Joshua Cohen, like Rawls, denies that democracy is a human right.  Cohen, like 
myself, defends a substantive and deliberative account of democracy, but argues that this 
right is not universal.  The main justificatory element of Cohen’s deliberative model is a 
process of public justification guided by an ideal procedure of political deliberation:   
The conception of justification that provides the core of the ideal of deliberative 
democracy can be captured in an ideal procedure of political deliberation. In such 
a procedure participants regard one another as equals; they aim to defend and 
criticize institutions and programs in terms of considerations that others have 
reason to accept, given the fact of reasonable pluralism and the assumption that 
those others are reasonable; and they are prepared to cooperate in accordance 
with the results of such discussion, treating those results as authoritative.18 
 
Cohen’s “fact of reasonable pluralism” is the equivalent of Gutmann and Thompson’s 
“persistence of moral disagreement,” and he uses it in the same way, to support his 
deliberative model.  He appeals to Thomas Scanlon’s notion19 of rules “which no one 
could reasonably reject” to argue that liberty and equality will be substantive elements of 
a proper democratic theory:   
[I]f one accepts the democratic process, agreeing that adults are, more or less 
without exception, to have access to it, then one cannot accept as a reason within 
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that process that some are worth less than others or that the interests of one group 
are to count for less than those of others.20  
 
Since Cohen’s theory has, as its two main features, a deliberative approach and a 
substantive element, I will treat his theory as consonant with the one I support.  I do this 
to point out that my disagreement with Cohen over the status of the right to democratic 
governance as a human right does not result from a difference between his conception of 
democracy and mine, for there is little substantive difference between us on this point.  I 
will now specify the nature of our disagreement, namely what is reasonable to expect in 
terms of agreement through public reason.   
 In “Is There a Human Right to Democracy?” Cohen argues that the reason 
democracy is not a human right is that making a human right of the right to democratic 
governance strips the latter of its demanding substance.  That is, he argues that human 
rights have a less demanding content, because they are the result of agreements to which 
all participants can accede – classifying democracy as a human right, then, dilutes the 
powerful claims about equality that democracy (but not human rights) demands: “The 
democracy that justice requires is associated with a demanding conception of equality, 
more demanding than the idea of membership associated with human rights.”21   
 One of Cohen's main premises is that “A conception of human rights is part of an 
ideal of global public reason: a shared basis for political argument that expresses a 
common reason that adherents of conflicting religious, philosophical, and ethical 
traditions can reasonably be expected to share,”22 and his answer to the main question 
rests directly upon it.  I contend that, like Rawls, Cohen unnecessarily limits the space of 
reasonably-expected agreement.  Through the kind of internal reasoning argued for by 
Akeel Bilgrami, I hold the view that it can be shown that the limits Cohen believes 
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restrict reasonably-expected agreement are too narrow.  I support a conception of global 
public reason that is limited in its depth only by the capacities for reason of individuals 
within the societies involved in the dialogue, and I do not suppose that there are societies 
in which there are no members with the capability of reasoning equal to that of myself or 
Joshua Cohen.  Since I can understand how the particular values variant across societies 
are supported by reasons that are available as topics of dialogue between members of 
different societies, and I presume that members of, say, Afghani society share this ability 
to understand, and to find ways – to the best of our collaborative ability – to reduce 
conflict between worldviews. I do not propose internal reasoning-informed deliberation 
as a panacea for all sources of conflict between societies, nor do I believe that such 
discussion can be expected to reliably yield regular adoption of compromise or some 
third position.  However, I believe that reducing sources of conflict – however intractable 
– is possible, and ought for that reason alone to be pursued.  The time-frame of such 
discussion can be decades and generations long, but with participants deliberating in 
order to reduce conflict, the expression of incommensurable conceptions of the good by 
those societies, and the conflict those expressions give rise to, can, over time, be modified 
so as to reduce conflict between societies.   
 
Democracy and Indirect Utilitarianism  
 I will now attempt to demonstrate IU's suitability as a ground for the claim that 
democracy as deliberation-based open government is the superior definition of 
democracy.  Having done this, I will argue that Nelson's outcome-based justification 
benefits from the more robust moral framework provided by IU.   
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 The positive account Nelson defends appears well-suited for augmentation by an 
indirect utilitarian foundation.  According to Nelson, democracy is justified in virtue of 
the tendency of open government to produce legislation that is just, according to his 
conception of an adequate morality, which is characterized by the three principles listed 
above.  As such, it seems that augmentation of the minimalist account of morality offered 
by Nelson – along with his outcome-based justification of democracy – by IU, favors a 
more robust consequentialist account of the justification of democracy.  Unlike Nelson's 
minimalist account, IU centers on a particular conception of the good, namely human 
well-being.  Aside from the fact that conceptions of the good vary, it is the level of 
analysis I wish to specify as the added value, here.  I contend that IU is sufficient to this 
task.  I will attempt to demonstrate as much now.   
 As regards Nelson's account of morality, IU can provide a more robust 
justification for each of the provisions.  For the requirement that “the principles must 
represent a system of rules proscribing harmful conduct and ensuring beneficial conduct,” 
IU can account for this provision by appealing in principle to an ideal social rule in order 
to supply the principle that failing to provide a system of rules proscribing harmful 
conduct and ensuring beneficial conduct runs counter to an important interest all citizens 
share.  Likewise with the requirement that “the principles must be able to serve as the 
public, shared set of principles constituting a stable, fundamental charter of a well-
ordered human association”: without such arrangements, individuals are deprived of the 
kind of social stability important to their interests.  For the requirement that “the 
principles must be able to perform the function articulated in (the previous requirement) 
in a society of free and independent persons,” liberty is the interest protected, and serves 
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as the object of the ideal social rule (that is, the point at which the principle involved 
directly references general utility) in question.   
 IU can also justify the claims made by Gutmann and Thompson in their theory of 
deliberative democracy.  Their six principles – reciprocity, publicity, accountability, basic 
liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity – can each be evaluated by IU's 
cost/benefit test, in order to determine whether or not IU can affirm these same 
principles.  Take, as an example, reciprocity.  The acceptance utility of affirming a 
system by which benefits of discursive exchange, as well as respect for the points of view 
of others, is mutual, is reasonably projected to be quite high, particularly in relation to the 
acceptance utility of a system that neglects reciprocity, since people are more likely to 
feel secure in their pursuit of good (or least bad) results when their points of view are 
respected.  Gutmann and Thompson's characterization of democracy as a conception of 
government that accords equal respect to the moral claims of each citizen, and is thus 
morally justifiable from the perspective of each citizen, increases the likelihood that the 
most moral outcomes will result from legislation that is justifiable to the greatest number 
of participants.   
 Here, then, is how I view IU as furthering the argument for a human right to 
democracy.  On Mill’s account, rights involve interests, and the interests served by the 
principle of justice that could be defended on utilitarian grounds are the most important.  
Rights to security and freedom of action are seen by Mill as most vital, and as such they 
correspond with the primary obligations of justice and thus take precedence over all other 
obligations.  While Mill and William Nelson agree that representative government is best, 
Nelson elaborates on Mill’s notion of the development of citizens’ moral character under 
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democratic government, and specifies openness (in his particular sense23) as the feature 
of democracy that, through its practice, leads to the most moral results.  These results 
appear both in legislation and in the character of democratic citizens, and will have to do 
with limiting the kinds of harm and encroachment on liberty that tend to result to a 
greater degree under other forms of government.  Thus far we have, under IU, a way of 
accounting for democracy’s being right, but do not yet have an account of democracy 
being a right.  Since, as Nickel argues, leading a life is the proper standard for defining 
the minimally decent human life, those interests necessary for leading a life will merit the 
protection furnished by human rights.  If democracy characterized by Nelson’s sense of 
openness is the one an Indirect Utilitarian would elect as the set of rules with the highest 
acceptance utility, then the government’s policy and legislation will tend to be more 
moral, and the institutions of that government will better protect the relevant basic human 
interests.  Having access to a democratic system would thus count as necessary for being 
able to make and carry out key decisions about the kind of life one will live and avoid 
being treated merely as a resource.  So if a case can be made in principle that the benefits 
of maintaining rights to those liberties necessary for leading a life outweigh the costs, and 
that democracy is the most effective way to support such rights, then IU furnishes us with 
the justification for a human right to democracy.   
 
Conclusion  
 In this chapter, my aim has been to ground my analyses of the concepts of 
democracy and human rights in IU, in order to argue that democracy is a human right.  
Having made my case, I have defended my main claim against the majority position that 
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democracy is not a human right, as represented by John Rawls and Joshua Cohen.  
Provided that my defense of the minority position on the question of whether democracy 
is a human right overcomes the objections raised by these two authors, I conclude that I 
have presented a viable account of a positive answer to the question of whether 
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IRAQI WOMEN AND THE HUMAN 
RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY 
 
 In this chapter, I analyze a theory of democracy as a human right, and offer some 
amendments to it.  I take as a starting point for this discussion the work of Allen 
Buchanan, and offer some (friendly) amendments to his approach to the main question of 
democracy as a human right.   Buchanan’s endeavor to establish a normative grounding 
for international law posits democracy as a human right, though one contingent upon its 
enabling the protection of more fundamental security rights. Such contingency is 
potentially problematic for the attempt to establish political equality, since there is 
insufficient argumentation in a defense of security rights to support political rights, as I 
attempt to demonstrate in part by appeal to the political situation currently faced by 
women in Iraq. Political rights such as those Buchanan defends are more securely 
grounded, I contend, in accounts of an egalitarian ideal, such as those defended by 
Elizabeth Anderson and Samuel Scheffler.  I argue that understanding the way in which 
Buchanan justifies equal security rights in Anderson’s and Scheffler’s way—as 
augmented by the work of Carol Gould—can also provide a justification for the political 
(human) right to democracy.  I present a reformulation of one component of Buchanan’s 
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approach based on Anderson’s work, with the aim of reinforcing Buchanan’s wider effort 
to provide an interests-based account of international justice that includes democracy as a 
human right.   
 Allen Buchanan’s approach is novel in that it critiques the orthodox foundation of 
international law, which posits—in a variety of theories—either peace or national interest 
as its aim.  He forcefully argues that these goals are inferior to international law’s proper 
aim, which he contends is justice. Since providing justification is in part a normative 
project, and the fulfillment of either peace or national interest is compatible with massive 
injustice—while the fulfillment of justice in turn entails a justifiable fulfillment of the 
other two—justice, Buchanan argues, is the superior normative principle and thus the 
proper justificatory foundation. Buchanan’s project is thus a theoretical effort to provide 
a moral foundation for international law, but one that is attuned to difference and 
injustice. 
 Buchanan’s general approach articulates an international framework of justice 
within which nations can permissibly differ culturally, institutionally, and in myriad other 
ways. One condition he places on permissibility of difference in the character of the 
institutional frameworks that constitute national governments is political participation, in 
the form of democratic governance. His effort to formulate democracy as a requisite of 
justice employs a particular conception of human rights, which I detail below.  I turn first 






 There are two senses of instrumentalism that come into play in the current 
discussion: one refers to the relation among values, for instance arguments that 
democracy is important only because it safeguards physical security; the other is 
normative-theoretical, and is used to distinguish consequentialist theories from, say, 
deontological ones.  In this chapter, I critique alternatives to Buchanan’s as being 
instrumental in the first sense – namely, that they pose the importance of democracy as 
predicated solely on what it can do to get us other things (security, etc.).  This criticism 
does not extend to the second sense, that consequentialist theories such as IU are 
instrumental, in the way that all values can, in some way or other (c.f. the variety of 
forms of utilitarianism) be seen as instrumental to utilities that measure a conception of 
the good, in this case (my use of IU) human well-being.   
 A deeper question about my use of IU in the argument for the human right to 
democracy is how it fits together with my arguments in support of Buchanan.  As with 
the other authors referenced in this volume, the aim of my use of IU is to provide a more 
robust normative-theoretical foundation for the human right to democracy than is to be 
found in any of the particular arguments (for rights, for democracy), and in turn present 
these arguments as defensible applications of IU to the question of democracy as a human 
right.  That is, in trying to show how IU can furnish a human right to democracy, I refer 
to auxiliary arguments I then spell out in IU terms, in order to cohere the various 
arguments and IU into a single argument with a comprehensive conception of the good 
tied to the human right to democracy.   
 
 93 
Foundational Issues for Human Rights Theories 
 One problem faced by human rights theorists is choosing the foundation to which 
they appeal in defending human rights. This problem arises due to the fact that a theory’s 
beginning determines, in part, its end. This, as Alistair Macleod notes,1 is because the 
particular justification given for a right is so intimately tied with its content and scope 
that the foundation provided determines to a significant degree the nature of the rights 
yielded by the particular theory. Working as one must with an elaborate array of social 
and political considerations from conception to implementation of such rights, a human 
rights theorist runs the risk of choosing a foundation well-suited for some tasks, yet 
unsuited for others.   
 The human rights literature contains a variety of arguments for democracy as a 
human right.  However since most are instrumental, they are vulnerable to the criticism 
that nondemocratic alternatives—which may secure the same end(s) to which democracy 
is instrumental—must be for that reason equally acceptable to proponents of these 
instrumental arguments. Due in part to this vulnerability that is characteristic of the 
alternatives, I turn here to the argument advanced by Allen Buchanan.2 
 
Buchanan’s Project 
 In his insightful and compelling Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, 
Buchanan argues that international law should be based on justice, rather than peace or 
national interest. His particular conception of justice requires access by all persons to 
institutions that protect human rights. On Buchanan’s account, principles of justice 
ascribe basic and uncontroversial rights to all humans just because they are humans. 
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Human rights, according to Buchanan, are the most general moral rights we can ascribe 
to individuals, and their correlative obligations are the most general obligations we can 
incur.  As a result, he argues, human rights cannot be overridden by direct utility 
maximization, or other such considerations.3 
 Among the various human rights, Buchanan specifies those which protect the 
interests most crucial to a decent human life, and designates these “basic human rights.”4  
Since the particular rights Buchanan specifies are generally aimed at the protection of the 
body of the individual, they can be broadly classified as basic security rights. Even those 
rights that do not appear to proscribe basic security violations are consequences of those 
that do. For example, the rights to due process and equality before the law relate directly 
to the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest, detention, or imprisonment—all three of 
which count as basic security rights. Given this, it can be said that Buchanan’s theory of 
justice is directed initially at the establishment of basic security rights, rather than, for 
example, economic or political rights. 
 
Democracy as a Human Right 
 In addition to the basic security rights listed above, Buchanan attempts to establish 
democracy as a human right. He acknowledges that this position places him in the 
minority among international legal scholars.5  Buchanan presents three separate but 
convergent arguments to establish democracy as a human right.   
 The first of Buchanan’s three arguments is the argument from equal moral 
consideration, the main premise of which is the moral equality principle. The argument 
for this principle is that equal consideration requires that all persons have the same 
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fundamental status, as equal participants, in important political decisions.6 Such status, 
the argument concludes, is optimally conveyed to individuals under democratic 
institutions. 
 Buchanan’s second argument is the instrumental argument. This states that even if 
democracy is not a basic human right, it is of such high instrumental value to the 
protection of basic human rights as to justify a right to it.7  This argument, among the 
three, is the one most obviously contingent upon the validity of the set of basic human 
rights. 
 Buchanan’s third argument for democracy as a human right is what he calls the 
agency argument. This argument states that in order to carry much moral weight (as, he 
argues, states must), states must serve as agents of their citizens.8 The optimal system by 
which this is accomplished, the argument claims, is democracy, since presumably those 
occupying the roles, designated by the political institutions of the state in question as 
having the highest decisional power, are unable to accurately reflect the will of that 
state’s citizens without some apparatus by which their preferences can be measured. 
 Buchanan states that all three arguments are compatible with one another, and that 
their convergence provides strong support for democracy as a human right. 9  The 
relationship they share can be characterized as a cluster argument, since they do not all 
point to a single conclusion directly (as with the relation between sub-conclusions and 
their main conclusion) but rather cohere such that they reinforce one another’s 
conclusions. In Buchanan’s schema, the moral equality principle seems intended to be the 
most basic of the three arguments, and the other two appear intended to situate the moral 
equality principle empirically. That is to say, the strength of the agency and instrumental 
 96 
arguments are dependent upon empirical claims in a way the moral equality principle is 
not – however, they are meant to add content to the cluster argument in such a way that 
democracy is secured as a human right. 
 However, the issue of the arguments’ compatibility is separate from that of their 
sufficiency to perform the work Buchanan intends. It is evident from his work that he 
views democracy as a human right as requiring argumentation in addition to that 
provided for the list of basic human rights cited earlier. So the argumentation that 
supports democracy as a human right is distinct from that which supports security rights. 
This is due in part to the fact that Buchanan’s list of more fundamental, less controversial 
(in that they are already recognized by the international legal system) human rights 
depends directly upon the argument from a minimally decent human life, whereas the 
argument for democracy as a human right rests upon the protection of the more basic 
human rights.  In the following section I will assess Buchanan’s argument for democracy 
as a human right in terms of its sufficiency, with an eye toward offering what support 
seems required.   
 
Problems for Buchanan’s Approach 
 While I strongly support not only Buchanan’s project to establish norms for the 
international legal system that center on human rights, but also his narrower project of 
establishing democracy as a human right, I believe I can identify a component of 
Buchanan’s theory, which—if clarified—can contribute a more compelling argument for 
democracy as a human right. I will first identify what I take to be the needed clarification, 
and then propose that a conception of human rights based not on individuals’ physical 
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security alone, but also on their political status, better serves as the foundation upon 
which Buchanan’s argument for democracy as a human right can rest. 
 Buchanan contends that together, the three arguments for democracy as a human 
right provide strong support for recognizing such a right under international law. Their 
compatibility is apparent. However, in regard to the strength of their support for a human 
right to democracy, their sufficiency is also at issue. With cluster arguments, the support 
for the conclusion is to be found either in a particular argument (which is unlikely, since 
there is thereby no reason to employ this form of argument), or from the relation among 
the clustered arguments, in “whole greater than sum” fashion. Among the three 
arguments or their interrelation, we ought to discern the requisite machinery by which 
Buchanan justifies democracy as a human right. 
 If we look to the instrumental argument to justify a human right to democracy, we 
seem to find no machinery for the establishment of democracy as a human right, since the 
content of this justification is simply that democracy appears to be useful in the securing 
of basic human rights. Such content is too vague to provide support specific to 
democracy, since alternate institutions seem able to protect basic human rights without 
fulfilling the democratic minimum. In any event, the issue here is empirical. 
 If we look to the agency argument, we also appear to lack the necessary machinery 
for establishing democracy as a human right, since it is conceivable that a benevolent 
despot might reliably reflect the preferences and interests of a nation’s citizens without 
satisfying the conditions of the democratic minimum, yet this same despot would satisfy 
the requirements of the agency argument. 
 Although it can be argued that the only sense in which agency is represented even 
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in democracy is indirect, a distinction can be drawn between a representation of agency 
as reliable reflection, on the one hand, and actual political participation, on the other. 
Under despotism, it is at most the first of these senses of agency which can occur, 
however since this is so also for most (if not all) democracies, this distinction appears not 
to diminish the implication that the agency argument is unable to perform the work 
Buchanan intends of it. Except in fully participatory institutions, the agency involved is 
indirect, and a benevolent despot can fulfill the criteria for indirect agency at least as well 
as democratic institutional agencies. 
 If we look to the moral equality principle, this justification is not contingent upon 
which type of institution protects basic human rights, but we must analyze the content of 
the moral equality principle in order to determine whether it requires democracy. The 
moral equality principle appears to require only that all individuals count as equals in 
moral consideration. Without further specification, there is nothing in this formulation 
that requires democracy, so we appear to have exhausted the three principles, taken on 
their own, without identifying the requisite machinery to justify a human right to 
democracy. 
 The final place to seek sufficient argumentation is in the relation between the three 
arguments. Buchanan argues elsewhere10 that multiple partial arguments suffice as whole 
arguments, that in effect three half-loaves make (at least) a whole loaf, and thus seems to 
carry this idea over to the present discussion. The problem with such reasoning is, at the 
very least, in the case of a partial argument, determining just how much of an entire 
argument it makes: half? one-fifth? If such argumentation does not reduce to absurdity, at 
minimum it seems unworkable. 
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 Buchanan states that “[the three arguments] are compatible; we need not choose 
between them. Together they provide strong support for recognizing the right to 
democratic governance as a basic human right under international law.”11  Since this 
statement yields no account of how the cluster of arguments supports the claim that there 
is a human right to democratic governance, I conclude that Buchanan’s argument for a 
human right to democratic governance stands to benefit from clarification. 
 Buchanan begins his justification by taking the Kantian moral equality principle for 
granted.  It thus appears that the moral equality principle is the fundamental premise, and 
the agency and instrumental arguments situate the moral equality principle in the political 
milieu, with its standard empirical assumptions. The problem I see is not necessarily that 
Buchanan lacks the argument for a human right to democratic governance – rather that 
the elements of his argument stand to benefit from clarification. I thus hope to offer here 
a more detailed account of just how the considerations to which Buchanan appeals 
support a human right to democratic governance. 
 It seems that two separate problems arise for Buchanan in this discussion. The first 
is that his case for security rights by itself does not provide clear enough argument for a 
right to democracy, as I have argued above. The second problem is that Buchanan seems 
not to provide any argument for equal security rights. That is, a claim to any right is not 
always a claim to an equal right, and thus an argument that establishes a right for all 
humans does not necessarily thereby establish equal human rights. The provision of 
equality here must itself be substantiated by argument. 
 As an example of a theory in which rights are universally held yet not equally so, 
one might as part of one’s theory lexically order creatures according to their complexity, 
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in which case the rights of human beings will not be equal to the rights of, e.g., dolphins 
(provided the latter are indeed less complex). Another kind of inequality of rights can 
appear in the priority with which they are protected. For example, the basic security 
rights of the elderly, while they are indeed basic security rights, might appear later in line 
for protection than those of younger people (not merely as a matter of implementation, 
but also of principle). The equality of rights depends in part on the structure of the 
argument provided for them. If the argument is based on a single characteristic all 
individuals possess to whatever minimal degree matters, then it turns out that all have 
equal rights. If the argument isn’t so based, inequality of universal rights is possible. 
 Nonetheless, this exploration of security rights suggests a more fruitful strategy. If 
the structure of one’s argument is such that equality of rights is provided, it could also be 
that the same structure might provide the right to democracy in virtue of the same feature 
that provides equality. My strategy here is to point out that by investigating the 
arguments Buchanan gives for equal security rights, it is possible to make an argument 
that Buchanan is committed to equality of the kind defended by Elizabeth Anderson,12 
Samuel Scheffler,13 and Carol Gould.14  I will present an account of equality that draws 
on strengths from all three authors’ accounts. 
 It is possible that Buchanan misconstrues the point of equality. Perhaps the point of 
equality is not guaranteeing protection of individuals’ basic security rights alone, but also 
guaranteeing access to political equality. Since Buchanan’s approach appears not to 
furnish a sufficiently rich engine to secure political rights, I will examine alternate 
approaches to equality.   
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A Viable Egalitarianism15 
 In “What Is the Point of Equality?” Elizabeth Anderson undertakes a thorough and 
thought-provoking analysis of a number of attempts to formulate the proper aim of social 
and political equality. Her positive case begins with a valuable inquiry into the nature of 
the systems of inequality to which egalitarian systems historically have responded. The 
problem, she argues, is the idea of justified social hierarchy, specifically the relationship 
between humans deemed inferior and those deemed superior. The variety of injustices 
which constitute oppression all share the common root of this social inequality. Thus, as 
Anderson remarks, “the proper negative aim of egalitarian justice is...to end oppression, 
which by definition is socially imposed. Its proper positive aim is...to create a community 
in which people stand in relations of equality to others.”16  Since the basic security 
violations that rightly concern Buchanan are rooted in unequal interpersonal relations, it 
might be said that Buchanan’s approach focuses on symptoms of the problem and not the 
problem itself. Oppression is the general problem, and Buchanan’s basic security 
violations are but one category of this problem. 
 It is clear that both Buchanan and Anderson are opposed to hierarchical societies, 
and endorse egalitarianism as part of the liberal framework with which both begin. They 
are thus both committed to equality from the outset. If, however, we then ask what is 
meant by ‘equality’ (or ‘in virtue of what is attribution of security rights equal?’), we get 
Anderson’s reply: that it’s about respect (as contrasted with oppression), and that part of 
what it is to respect people is to include them in participation, while another part of what 
it is to respect people is to not violate their basic security rights. Anderson argues that 
such a formulation of the idea of equality supports the right to democracy in the 
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following way: 
[Egalitarian political movements] assert the equal moral worth of persons. 
...Negatively, the claim repudiates distinctions of moral worth based on birth or 
social identity–on family membership, inherited social status, race, ethnicity, 
gender, or genes. ...Positively, the claim asserts that all competent adults are 
equally moral agents: everyone equally has the power to develop and exercise 
moral responsibility, to cooperate with others according to principles of justice, 
to shape and fulfill a conception of their good.17 
 
When equality is understood as equal respect for moral agents, this particular kind of 
respect for agency not only prohibits terrorizing agents, which provides an argument for 
security rights (as in the first paragraph quoted above), but also encourages allowing 
agency to participate, which provides an argument for democracy.  Equality formulated 
as equal respect for moral agents is the concept that constitutes the deep structure of 
Anderson’s approach. So if we think of an Andersonian argument as an argument for 
security rights, then it’s also an argument for democracy. 
 Thus the kind of egalitarianism advanced by Anderson is properly called 
democratic; its focus is equality of political rights. However, she does not limit her 
standard of equality to those kinds of human functioning that are specifically political 
(e.g., voting, running for office, and the like), but extends it to all kinds of functioning 
necessary for standing as an equal citizen.18 
 Anderson lists three structural points of democratic egalitarianism, which outline 
guarantees that she argues are necessary to functioning as a free and equal citizen, and to 
avoiding oppression. First, “Democratic equality guarantees effective access to the 
various human capabilities necessary for functioning as an equal citizen and avoiding 
oppression.”19 This provision specifies that, among the various human capabilities, the 
effective access guaranteed by democratic equality is limited to those capabilities 
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necessary for functioning as an equal citizen (the positive provision) and avoiding 
oppression (the negative provision). So a provision of Anderson’s approach is access to a 
limited range of capabilities, one which excludes frivolous considerations, but which also 
includes the possibility of individual human flourishing.   
 The second provision specifies that “[d]emocratic equality guarantees not access to 
equal levels of functioning, but effective access to levels of functioning sufficient to stand 
as an equal in society.”20  This provision establishes that political institutions are not 
obliged to provide a uniform level of functioning for all individuals, but limits 
institutional obligations to the guarantee of access to levels of functioning sufficient to 
stand as an equal in society. So I needn’t be provided access to a level of functioning 
which makes it possible for me to do everything the mayor does, but rather that I be 
provided access to a level of functioning which prevents me from occupying a position of 
citizenship inferior to that of the mayor.  The point Anderson makes here appears limited 
to political equality, as it is explicit only about obligations of political institutions.  
Economic inequalities are problematic to the extent that they undermine equal social 
standing, however I leave the point here as limited to the obligations of political 
institutions, and remain silent on the issue of economic inequality here.   
 The third provision is that “Democratic equality guarantees access to a package of 
capabilities sufficient for standing as an equal over the course of an entire life; i.e., it is 
not a ‘starting-gate’ theory.”21  Individuals are not simply to be provided access to 
capabilities during a specific time, after which the relevant political institutions are 
exonerated from further obligations of justice. Rather the level must be maintained over 
the course of an individual life. 
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 Concurring with and elaborating on Anderson’s thesis in his “What Is 
Egalitarianism?,” Samuel Scheffler argues that distributive-egalitarian arguments cannot 
stand alone, but must rather be grounded in a more general conception of equality, one 
which establishes it as a normative ideal: 
[E]quality is most compelling when it is understood as a social and political 
ideal that includes but goes beyond the proposition that all people have equal 
moral worth. It is this ideal that we invoke when we say that our society should 
be organized as a society of equals. The case is analogous to other human 
relationships that we take to be governed by an ideal of equality. When we say, 
for example, that a friendship or a marriage should be a relationship of equals, 
we do not mean merely that the participants are of equal moral worth but also 
that their relationship should have a certain structure and character. Similarly, I 
believe, our notion of a society of equals expresses a normative ideal of human 
relations.22 
 
Scheffler treats this argument as consonant with Anderson’s conception of democratic 
equality, as do I and – by my reading – as would Anderson.  
 However, since it is a capabilities approach, Anderson’s formulation of equality 
might instead weaken Buchanan’s approach if, as with standard formulations of 
capabilities approaches, it is committed to a purely abstract universalism with respect to 
human rights.  In Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, Carol Gould argues that 
abstract universality involves a problematic essentialism that exposes it to criticisms 
similar to those advanced by Marxists and feminists – that conceptions of human essence 
employ standards that tend to exclude individuals we normally consider to be un-
controversially human.  Gould supports capabilities approaches, with important 
qualifications. One qualification is that the concept of universality inherent in human 
rights be also concrete rather than purely abstract. What is concrete about the universality 
Gould suggests is that it is constituted by intersociative norms – those constructed 
through the networked interactions among particular caring and choosing individuals. 
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Intersociative norms provide a way of accounting for universal norms through 
contextualization in what Gould calls “‘individuals-in-relations’ ontology,” which 
characterizes the human not only as a discrete individual but also as a social being. 
Establishing universal claims in this way, Gould argues, avoids both cultural relativism 
and cultural imperialism, because it neither affirms the lack of any universal moral 
standards, nor does it impose a putative universal standard that is alien to whichever 
society is under discussion. Since it is built not from abstraction but from concrete 
interactions among individuals, it is nonessentialist. 
 In order to establish this concrete notion of universality, Gould identifies care as 
one of three sources of intersociative norms.  It is this particular aspect of her project that 
I contend can furnish Anderson’s approach with the account of how humans acquire 
capabilities essential to individual liberty. Regarding liberty, Anderson makes the point 
that “Libertarians tend to identify freedom with formal, negative freedom: enjoying the 
legal right to do what one wants without having to ask anyone else's permission and 
without interference from others. This definition of freedom neglects the importance of 
having the means to do what one wants.”23  Gould argues that having the means to do 
what one wants involves certain developmental requirements, and that among these is 
care.  Anderson’s articulation of freedom’s positive aspect is compelling, but incomplete. 
I contend that the account of how one comes to have the means to do what one wants, 
which Anderson argues is essential to the concept of freedom, can be filled in by Gould. 
In addition, a Gouldian amendment to Anderson’s approach renders democratic 
egalitarianism immune to criticisms about essentialism that have been aimed at abstract 
universalism.   
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Clarification of Buchanan Through the Proposed Egalitarian Approach 
 In Buchanan’s argument, security rights are justified to the degree to which they 
protect basic interests.  However, in Buchanan we find no account that interests should be 
protected equally – he appears to take equal protection of interests for granted.  Buchanan 
thus presumes a kind of equality about basic security rights.  There are two different 
claims Buchanan makes – one explicit, one implicit.  The first is that we each have basic 
security rights, the other is that those rights are equal.  That is, it is possible to say that 
everyone has security rights, without saying that everyone’s rights are equal; one 
individual’s security rights could be stronger than another’s.  Although Buchanan appears 
to presume such equality of rights, upon analysis he provides no argument for it. 
 The egalitarian approach I’ve presented above is able to furnish Buchanan with the 
argument that everyone’s rights are equal.  The way in which security rights become 
equal security rights is via Anderson’s deep back structure, in her argument for equality 
as equal respect for moral agents.  In addition, if we take the egalitarians to be providing 
Buchanan an argument for equal security rights, I suggest it is profitable to then look at 
whether that argument gives a right also to democracy.  Looking to Anderson’s deep 
back structure of equality as equal respect for moral agents, I contend that the argument 
supplied Buchanan for equal security rights also provides the right to democratic 
governance.  Since Anderson’s kind of egalitarianism requires equal standing in society, 
and this involves not only a prohibition against taking advantage of inferior social 
standing but allowing agency to participate, democracy is strongly recommended as the 
political system that meets democratic egalitarianism’s requirements.   
 Comparing the two formulations of justice, Anderson’s account of equality aims 
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directly at political rights, while Buchanan’s account aims at basic security rights, which 
are significantly more robust than his political rights.  Thus the conception of equality 
employed (but not argued for) by Buchanan is equality of basic security rights, which 
I’ve argued is insufficient to the task to which Buchanan’s theoretical structure is set, 
which is the establishment of a system of justice in which democracy is a human right. 
 If Buchanan defines human rights not simply as a list of rights that protect the 
interests most crucial to human flourishing, but as protecting interests necessary for 
functioning as an equal citizen and in freedom from oppression, he can incorporate 
democratic egalitarianism as part of the machinery of his system of justice and thereby 
furnish the clarification that benefits his argument for a human right to democratic 
governance.  Rather than merely providing for a minimally decent life, justice ought to be 
defined as providing for a minimally decent, unoppressed life.  The capabilities of 
functioning as an equal in society and in freedom from oppression plausibly qualify as 
interests crucial to human well-being, and thus ought to correlate to human rights in 
Buchanan’s theory.  This alone does not get us as far as democracy, until we tie 
functioning as an equal in society and in freedom from oppression to the second-order 
selection of democracy as a set of rules with a high acceptance utility.  I return to this 
below.   
 In the following section I present a problematic political case with which I intend to 
demonstrate the differences I have argued are present in the comparison between 
Buchanan approach and the amended version I propose.  The point of the example will be 
to demonstrate that founding one’s theory of human rights on the protection of security 
rights is insufficient to justify a human right to democracy. 
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Iraq, Shari’a, and Equal Political Rights for Women 
 The example case concerns the current political situation in Iraq. I intend to show 
that while Islamic law (Shari’a) provides equal security rights for women, it does not 
provide equal political rights. As a result, Buchanan’s security-based rights can benefit 
from clarification. In this section I will first substantiate the claim that Shari’a involves a 
tendency to define gender roles that assign unequal political rights to women, and then 
attempt to demonstrate how the case of Iraq is problematic for Buchanan, but not 
Anderson.   
 According to a study by the United States Institute of Peace, “Islamism...is destined 
to play a major role in the future of Iraqi politics.”24  Many Islamist regimes are 
characterized by denial of women’s social and political rights.  This issue thus arises with 
each new possibility of a regime that is subject to the influence of Islamic law. A 
development in January 2009 – in which guarantees that at least 25 percent of 
Parliamentary seats would be set aside for women that were included in earlier versions 
of Iraqi election law were excluded from the law’s published version – demonstrates the 
frailty of the constitutional safeguards placed against such exclusion.25 
 Security rights for women in Islamic societies, however, appear roughly equal to 
those of men.26 Thus under Shari’a Iraqi women have equal security rights, but they are 
likely to have unequal political rights.27 Article 2 of the Iraqi constitution reads 
First: Islam is the official religion of the State and it is a fundamental source of 
legislation:  
 A. No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be 
established.  
 B. No law that contradicts the principles of democracy may be established.  
 C. No law that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this 
       constitution may be established.  
 
It is possible that the patriarchal tendency of Islam will deny women political rights. A 
 109 
sufficient number of the citizens of Iraq may be willing to accept this, as a result of their 
placing greater value on religious interests. In addition, the proscription of such a 
development by Iraqi political institutions can count as religious persecution, since it 
denies Iraqi citizens the freedom to live in accordance with their religious beliefs. While 
the perils to women’s political rights represented in article 2A are provided for in article 
2C,28 the “established provisions of Islam” are likely to reflect that culture’s curtailment 
of the political rights of women, which means that these two articles are likely to come 
into conflict with one another at some point. What will result from this conflict is 
anyone’s guess, but the prospects are dim for women’s rights, given that the allegiance of 
most Iraqi citizens to their religious leaders seems to be stronger than that to the current 
government, in light of how that government’s legitimacy is questioned by many, given 
that it was formed in collaboration with the United States.    
 Because Shari’a, like benevolent despotism, can conceivably guarantee protection 
of basic human rights without guaranteeing political rights, Buchanan’s approach does 
not appear to provide his desired answer to the question of the social justice of women’s 
curtailed political rights under Shari’a. Since Anderson’s approach aims directly at 
political equality, we can reasonably expect better results from her approach in this case.  
First, because democratic egalitarianism guarantees effective access to the various human 
capabilities necessary for standing as an equal in society and maintaining freedom from 
oppression, and Shari’a denies some of these, democratic egalitarianism will preclude 
incorporation of Shari’a into statute. Certainly rights specific to political capabilities are 
among these, but so also are a number of capabilities necessary for equal citizenship, 
such as education, freedom of movement, engagement in public discourse, to name but a 
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few. Each of these examples represents capabilities denied women in a number of 
Islamist societies. By securing access to the spectrum of capabilities necessary for 
standing as an equal citizen, democratic egalitarianism precludes such oppression. 
 Second, because democratic egalitarianism guarantees not access to equal levels of 
functioning, but effective access to levels of functioning sufficient to stand as an equal in 
society, and Shari’a denies such access, democratic egalitarianism will preclude 
incorporation of Shari’a into statute. The second provision of democratic egalitarianism 
ensures not that all function at the same level, but access to a level of functioning is 
guaranteed such that every individual is free from a social position substantially inferior 
to that of any other. 
 Third, because democratic egalitarianism guarantees access to a package of 
capabilities sufficient for standing as an equal over the course of an entire life, it would 
not only have precluded incorporation of Shari’a into statute in the formation of the Iraqi 
Constitution, but would also preclude incorporation into statute of Shari’a as a future 
political contingency. 
 It might be argued that Shari’a is a problem also for Anderson’s view, in the 
following way.  Since it can be argued that women and men are treated as equals, but 
have different roles to play in Islamic society, and one difference in these roles is that 
women do not have the political rights men have, under Shari’a men and women are in 
fact treated as equals, even though they do not have the same political rights.29  However, 
if we recall Anderson’s deep back structure of respect for moral agents, there are two 
parts to her kind of respect for agency, such that – negatively speaking – we ought not to 
impede human agency from expressing itself and – positively speaking – we ought to 
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allow it to participate. Given this distinction and Anderson’s requirement that both 
obligations be met, the situation does not meet Anderson’s standard of equality, so poses 
no problem for her.   
 In summary, I contend that Buchanan’s, Anderson’s, Scheffler’s and Gould’s 
cosmopolitan arguments are mutually reinforcing. Buchanan makes a strong case for 
cosmopolitanism by offering a substantial positive theory of international justice based 
on protection of universal human interests, and Anderson, Scheffler, and Gould 
strengthen his argument by making what’s implicit in Buchanan explicit, in part by 
shifting Buchanan’s foundational focus from security rights to political rights. 
 For sufficient motivation for such a change in his definition of human rights, we 
need look no further than Buchanan’s moral equality principle. Recall that the moral 
equality principle is Buchanan’s strongest case for democracy as a human right, but is 
itself insufficient as justification for democracy as a basic human right. Limiting the 
concept of equality to that of inviolability of basic security rights ignores the social 
dimension of human existence, and thus the idea that oppression is an entailment of 
social inequality. This is what I mean by saying that Buchanan misconstrues the point of 
equality.  However, his approach appears able to accommodate a change in its concept of 
equality. Acknowledging the social nature of human existence thus motivates the 
enhancement of the concept of equality in the moral equality principle, such that it 
incorporates guarantees of effective access to the various human capabilities necessary 
for functioning as an equal citizen and avoiding oppression, which is democratic 
egalitarianism.   
 With the proposed change to Buchanan’s concept of equality, institutions will, 
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under a democratic-egalitarian conception of human rights, thus be legitimate only if they 
protect the right to equal citizenship and freedom from oppression. This approach will 
secure the protection of the entire list of basic security rights that motivates Buchanan’s 
approach.  So it appears as though by undertaking this redefinition, Buchanan sacrifices 
nothing that is important to his approach, and gains the machinery required for the task of 
justifying democracy as a human right.  By proposing this friendly amendment to 
Buchanan’s approach, my aim has been to offer a more robust justification for democracy 
as a human right, which I hope might promote discussion toward a more promising 
discussion of political rights as human rights.   
 
Indirect Utilitarianism and the Human Right to Democracy 
 I turn now to a demonstration of how IU supports the central claims of my 
“Andersonized Buchanan” account.  One element of Elizabeth Anderson's argument is 
that egalitarianism is a response to systems of inequality – that the problem 
egalitarianism addresses is the idea of justified social hierarchy, specifically the 
relationship between citizens deemed inferior and those deemed superior.  Under IU, the 
minimization of oppression passes the “in principle” utility test by benefitting the many, 
rather than the few: since the most severe kinds of oppression are in most instances 
constituted by the rule of a minority over a majority, the costs – in utilitarian terms – of 
maintaining oppression outweighs the benefits of such a system, thereby failing the “in 
principle” utility test and thus (rightly) lacking justification under IU.   
From there, I contend, Andersons’s argument spells out, with specificity lacking 
in the general account of IU, what a set of first-order rules indicated by the second-order 
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standards of IU looks like.  That is, if we take the Andersonized Buchanan argument as 
the foreground discussion of democracy as a human right, IU supplies a way to reason 
about the background structure of the argument, including how we arrive at the 
assumptions Buchanan and Anderson make, and how to reason about the relative value of 
the concepts endorsed in the other accounts involved in the discussion of democracy as a 
human right.  The benefit of couching the foreground discussion (Buchanan, Anderson, et 
al.) in IU is that IU gains in specificity from the foreground argument, while the 
foreground gains orientation within a more thoroughgoing normative framework.  A 
direct argument from IU to a human right to democracy would lack this dynamic 
structure, and offer less by way of guidance through the argument – hence the strategy 
taken here.   
 The grounding of my claims about clarifying Allen Buchanan's case for 
democracy as a human right in IU, I contend, strengthens my general argument.  In this 
chapter, I argue that since the basic security violations that rightly concern Buchanan are 
rooted in unequal interpersonal relations, Buchanan’s approach focuses too much on 
symptoms of the problem, and not enough on the problem itself. Oppression is the 
general problem, and the basic security violations that concern Buchanan are but one 
category of this problem.  By grounding this argument in IU, I am able to buttress this 
argument with the claim that, if a persistent wrong is identified as a symptom of a deeper 
wrong (as with the relationship between basic security violations and oppression, more 
generally), then a case can be made in principle for addressing the deeper wrong directly, 
as with my Andersonized Buchanan argument.   
 In this case, the deeper wrong is the maintenance of political inequality.  This is 
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because the likelihood that the general welfare is greater under systems of maintained 
social inequality is virtually nonexistent.  As such, the cost-benefit test, as articulated 
under IU, reliably recommends against the maintenance of social inequality.  In this way, 
IU justifies the deeper background of Anderson's conception of equality.   
 According to IU, democracy has a high acceptance value, since it is the form of 
government that involves the greatest advantage (least disadvantage) for human well-
being.  This is due to the way democracy tends to support mutual respect and minimizes 
political inequality, encourages deliberation, requires openness, and so on.  IU advises 
that we choose the set of rules that maximizes well-being, and the auxiliary arguments 
throughout the present dissertation, concern the best formulations of the relevant 
concepts, which in turn indicate particular sets of rules (regarding democracy, rights, and 
so on).  So IU is a second-order aiming at human well-being, with the auxiliary 
arguments operating as first-order sets of rules.  From these – if my arguments (and those 
of the philosophers I reference) are persuasive – I derive an argument for the human right 
to democracy.   
 
Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I have argued that democracy is a human right.  In order to 
support this claim, my argument proceeded from a foundational moral grounding 
(Indirect Utilitarianism), through analyses of the concepts involved (human rights and 
democracy), to my conclusion.  I began by specifying the definition of democracy I find 
superior; proceeded to an explication of the normative theory to which I appeal for my 
claims; then to a discussion of the justification of rights in general; followed by a 
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discussion of human rights, and finally to my case for the human right to democracy.  
This I followed with a survey of the literature representing the opposing position, in order 
to catalogue the concerns my positive account needed to address.  I then proceeded to my 
own justificatory account.  Having presented my positive account, I addressed the various 
criticisms of the minority position, using arguments that either blunt such criticism or 






















1 Macleod, Universal Human Rights: Moral Order in a Divided World, p. 14 
2 In so doing, I will not myself formulate an entirely unique account of how to establish the right to 
democracy, rather I will point out how one of the most interesting and prominent attempts to do so fails, 
and then suggest what more can help it. This paper thus begins with Buchanan as its subject and a viable 
account of democracy as a human right as its aim, and therefore does not represent a free-standing defense 
of human rights in general, nor of other fundamental concepts, such as equality. 
3 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International  
Law, 122 – 3 [I offer an account of Millian rights that do not run afoul of this stricture.]  
4 Ibid., p. 129  
5 Ibid., p. 142  
6 Ibid., p. 143 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 2004, p. 144  
9 Ibid., 2004, p. 145 
10 Ibid., 1983 
11 Ibid., 2004, p. 145  
12 Anderson, 1999  
13 Scheffler, 2003  
14 Gould, 2004 
15 Anderson’s and Scheffler’s arguments occur within the discussion of the merits of luck egalitarianism. 
For this article, I will remain silent with respect to the merits of the arguments for and against luck 
egalitarianism, and will make use only of these authors’ positive accounts of the proper understanding of 
egalitarianism.  







23 Anderson, Ethics, p. 315 [emphasis added]  
24 Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World   
25 ‘Changes in Iraq Election Law Weaken Quota for Women’, New York Times, January 13, 2009, 
accessed via <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/14/world/middleeast/14iraq.html> on 1/14/2009.  
26 Here I refer to security rights per se. That other impositions on the interests of women – for instance, the 
denial of education – worsen the overall situation of women in Islamic societies is a claim I do not dispute.  
27 The Qur’an is in fact silent on the issue of women’s political rights, thus the source of gender-based 
repression is not doctrinal. Feisal Abdul Rauf offers an account of the systematic apparatus that permits 
such patriarchal insinuation into the ideology of Shari’a: 
 
The problem lies in confusing cultural norms with religious belief or law. Unless we 
separate the theological from the sociocultural dimensions of the issue, we are likely to 
misread the situation. What complicates the understanding of the gender issue, even by 
Muslims, is that Muslim jurists regarded the custom (adah, ‘urf), or common law of a 
society, as a source of law when the Qur’an or sunnah was silent on an issue. Thus, what 
was custom in a particular time or place found its way into Islamic law. [Rauf, 2004] 
 
This appears to account (in at least broad terms) for how patriarchal cultural norms have become associated 
with Islamic law.  
28 Article 14 of the Iraqi Constitution reads “Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination based 
on gender, race, ethnicity, origin, color, religion, creed, belief or opinion, or economic and social status.” 
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